Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1974



People's China: A Symposium

Lucien Bianco
Mark Gayn
Edward E. Rice
Juergen Domes
L. La Dany
Audrey Donnithorne
Krishna P. Gupta

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

Dick Wilson

Book Reviews

Foy D. Kohler
Norton S. Ginsburg
Kenneth Lieberthal

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SEPT-OCT 1974 VOL XXIII

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Cover photo: A member of the model Tachai Production Brigade in Shansi Province, People's Republic of China. A 1973 photo by Vincent Mentzel via Nancy Palmer.

Photo opposite: Chinese of different generations look on as a squad of people's militia awaits its turn to drill in Peking's Tien An Men Square in 1958. Photo by H. Cartier-Bresson for Magnum.

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People's China: 25 Years

EDITORS' NOTE: October 1 of this year marks the 25th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. With the experience of a quarter of a century to go on, it now seems both possible and appropriate to reflect on the continuities and changes in China under Communist rule. To what extent has Chinese society undergone fundamental alterations over the last 25 years, and to what extent have traditional institutions, behavior, and modes of thinking persisted, whether in their old guises or in new incarnations? What impact has Communist power had on any changes that have occurred? That is, to what degree has the regime managed to shape society according to its own vision, and to what degree has it found itself a prisoner of larger historical forces?

Assessing the continuities and changes is no mean task. Not only can analysts disagree about the amount of change observable, but they can also differ on how to approach such an evaluation. For example, they may adopt a variety of standards against which to measure the continuities and changes—a distillation of the essence of Chinese culture across the ages, China at the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, China in the 1930's prior to Japanese invasion, China on the eve of the Communist takeover in 1949, etc. They may likewise choose to look at the broad spectrum of Chinese life or to focus on a specific segment of it.

The following symposium reflects our belief that truth emerges from a contention of viewpoints and that no single approach to the subject enjoys a monopoly on insights. Our participants reach diverse conclusions and arrive at them by different paths and from different perspectives. But we hope that their contributions, taken together, will afford heightened understanding of present-day Chinese reality.

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"Fu-chiang" and Red Fervor

By Lucien Bianco

The "unchanging China" of old has changed a great deal over the last 25 years—but then, so too have even the least progressive of the underdeveloped countries. Among major trends in China today, one of the most important and most fraught with consequences is the rapid decrease in the death rate—yet this is a phenomenon common to the whole underdeveloped world and one which would have taken place in China (if at a slower pace) even if the former regime had survived. Obviously, the assessment of two-and-a-half decades of Communist rule cannot be made simply by describing Chinese developments in terms of planetary trends which Peking is either anticipating or trailing. Yet with respect to all aspects of change in China, it is necessary to raise what to Maoists is a sacrilegious issue, embodied in two questions: What in the Chinese Communist course represents the traditional quest for *fu-chiang* (wealth and power), a goal obstinately pursued for over a century first by officials of the Ch'ing dynasty and later by Chiang Kai-shek? Conversely, what accomplishments of the Communist regime are clearly of a different order?

Our initial postulate is that, to date, the most obvious success of the Chinese Communists lies in their having progressed, with much greater efficiency, along the course pursued by their predecessors. While perhaps unpleasant to Maoist ears, such praise is, in fact, less paradoxical than it may seem. Certainly, it was an agreement with the Communists on the primacy of the goals of national greatness and on "progress" in a broad sense—from economic development to the struggle against flies, epidemics, bound feet, and countless other effects of backwardness and tradition—that brought over to the regime, or to the Communist movement before establishment of the regime, so many Chinese intellectuals otherwise unconvinced by Marxist ideology and doubtful about the methods of the latest claimants to the "Mandate of Heaven."

Nowhere are the changes and accomplishments of the present regime more obvious than in the realm of foreign policy, and nowhere have the gains more clearly contributed to *fu-chiang*. The revolution has enabled this venerable nation, humiliated by a century of "unequal treaties" and imperialist encroachments, to regain its dignity. The break with Moscow climaxed the recapture of China's independence, a process which was perhaps less obvious during the first decade of the regime. Once one accepts the logic of *fu-chiang,* there is nothing surprising in the Chinese *volte-face* from condemnations of Soviet-American collusion to negotiations with Washington. The same may be said for China's support of Pakistan against the Bangladesh liberation movement; its diplomatic relations with Pinochet's Chile; the flowers sent by the Chinese government to the Spanish Embassy following the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco (Peking in an earlier day would have called it an "execution"); or the warm welcome extended in the Chinese capital to the United Kingdom's former Prime Minister, the Conservative Edward Heath.

Ultimately, only the spreading of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese "model" of development can be dissociated from the quest for *fu-chiang.* More diffuse and extensive than the earlier propagation of Confucianism and Chinese civilization in the narrow corner of the globe surrounding the Middle Kingdom, this proselytizing process (and with it the propagation of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung) is

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also much more perishable. It will doubtless survive for a while until it is eventually repudiated by reality. Once the torch of revolution ignites another huge country—say an Indonesia, a Brazil, or an India—attention will be diverted from China, making it possible to view the Chinese revolutionary experience in clearer perspective, as just another variant of the Soviet experience. In a sense this will be to Peking's benefit, for stripping China of the trappings of a unique revolutionary model will leave in bold relief the strength and considerable weight in international affairs of a populous and industrious subcontinent, rich in raw materials and natural resources.

When turning from the external to the internal political sphere, one again discovers important continuity (preserving the authoritarian and paternal power of the past) but also considerable change. From the *fu-chiang* perspective, the change represents progress. The authoritarian power today has a much firmer hold on the governed than in the imperial age: it reaches to the village level, its initiatives and directives are felt almost everywhere, and centralization is more effective. Measured in particular against the last century of Chinese history—which was marked by the fall of a dynasty, the chaos of an interregnum, and incomplete and abortive efforts to restore unity—the gains are obvious. The rule of law and order has been restored in a unified China. Centralization, order, and security are not, of course, invulnerable, as was amply demonstrated by the Cultural Revolution; yet the regime's survival of this ordeal is proof of its strength. The one potential weakness in the political sphere may lie in the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a regime that is essentially oligarchic. As in Russia, the real political debate is played out among cliques of very limited size. One of them, or a coalition of factions, has the capacity to initiate a sudden drastic shift of course, whether or not its implementation causes social malaise.

The foregoing assessment makes short shrift of the claims of "originality" for the Chinese revolution so often trumpeted by Mao, his propagandists, and his exegetes. But we have not yet gotten to the heart of the matter—which lies in the question of relations between the rulers and the ruled or, as the Communists say, between the party and the masses. The flood of proclamations, directives, and debates originated on this topic by Peking represents something more than a simple propaganda operation.

China on the world stage: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations, confer with Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary-General, in New York on April 9, 1974.

—T. Chen/United Nations via Keystone.

They suggest a fundamental and growing concern, felt perhaps most acutely by Mao himself, over a problem (or "contradiction") stemming from application of the political principle of "democratic centralism." This anxiety has generated apparently sincere endeavors to give the "masses" a "say," to encourage their initiative, to develop their creativity by giving them a feeling of participating in decisions and their execution, and not solely in production. In this respect, in terms of both insights and intentions, there has certainly been novelty and originality in the Maoist course, reflecting a departure from the Chinese bureaucratic tradition (both under the Empire and under the Republic) as well as from Bolshevik and Stalinist practice. Such innovation dates back beyond the "mass line" of the Yenan period to the need of the first Chinese soviets to gain and retain the support of the rural masses in order to survive.

On the whole, efforts in this regard somehow succeeded (with periodic rectifications dictated by a careful listening to the needs and daily concerns of the masses) in the Central Soviet Area of Kiangsi-Fukien and then in the "Liberated Areas" of Northwest China, but they have proved much less satisfactory in the country as a whole since the mid-1950's. The explanation for this is not essentially a matter of geographic scale: the record for the first five years of the People's Republic of China seems less negative than the overall picture of Communist

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rule for a quarter of a century. The short-term objectives of the new rulers could still be in harmony with the wishes of the rural masses at a time when the property of landlords and rich peasants was being confiscated and divided among the other villagers.

Since the acceleration of agrarian collectivization in 1955, there has been no lack of periodic rectifications (in fact, the masses wish they had been less frequent). As before, those rectification efforts to which the regime resorted out of necessity (and which, owing to circumstances, were dictated by a "listening" to the masses) more or less succeeded in the sense of achieving short-term goals, even though they also entailed undesired aftereffects. Most other so-called "rectifications" failed. A power with no rival, no longer confronted with the risk of being overthrown as soon as it ceased listening to the masses (as would have been the case with the fragile rural bases of the 1930's and 1940's), was freed of all restraints against arbitrary decisions and exploitation of the agricultural producers.

This is not to suggest that a revolutionary power must obediently trail behind the masses. Certainly, the latter are likely to discover too late the need for birth control, they are not spontaneously ready to toil in order to finance "primitive accumulation" of capital, they will not free themselves from the grasp of superstitution without further education.

What is suggested here is that Maoist education has not been very successful, and—more to the point—that this is not surprising considering the conditions under which it has been attempted. Reversing the terms is not enough. Sending officials, young graduates, and other privileged urban dwellers to the countryside to "learn" from the villagers will not alone transform the reality—a Communist society marked above all by a dreary, classic lack of political life (which is only highlighted by the superabundance of slogans) and by a gap between the rulers and the ruled which works to the special disadvantage of the rural masses.

Besides defaulting on a crucial point (who will educate the Great Teacher?), pedagogy does not

China's steel capital Anshan (in Northeast China)—an important contributor to the nation's drive for industrial and national power.

—Miao Ming/China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

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compensate for the deficiencies in the dialogue between party and people. Despite the concerns and initiative which constitute the originality of Maoism —which is wholly in the realm of theory—the masses in the final analysis still lack the means of expressing themselves. What Mao wishes for, what he has sometimes attempted, is moving but not convincing (somewhat like Lenin's belated discovery of some of the dangers inherent in the system he established). The contradiction inherent in the expression "*directing* the *spontaneity* of the masses" has not been resolved, or rather it has been resolved in favor of the first of the two terms.

From the outset, in Juichin and then in Yenan, the problem was not a matter of finding the solution to this theoretical contradition but of realizing a fragile, if sophisticated, empirical compromise. Cumulatively, the rectification campaigns, the Cultural Revolution, and countless other measures and movements since 1949 have certainly rendered the position of those who direct the masses, the Communist cadres, a great deal less secure and comfortable than that of their counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (assuredly, the fact that this more precarious status has involved purges usually not accompanied by physical liquidation represents another "plus" for the Chinese approach). But it should be recognized, on the one hand, that the effectiveness of the myriad of movements and campaigns is wearing thin, as eloquently confirmed by the disproportion between the drastic character of the Cultural Revolution and its meager results in terms of forcing cadres to heed the masses. On the other hand, and this is the major point, the masses themselves stand to gain little from these periodic campaigns, which attack everything but the people's inferior conditions and the subjugation they endure. They desire most of all, or so it seems, to be delivered from the agitation or periodic nightmare of these campaigns.

It is certainly risky to speak of the longings or aspirations of the masses, for the people are silent. The silence of unorganized masses, capable of expressing dissatisfaction (if not demands) only by passivity and petty thievery, as during the Great Leap—this is what reminds one of the Soviet precedent. In fact, both regimes have much in common despite the violent accusations leveled by Mao against the "degenerate revisionists" in Moscow. There is the same monopoly of power in the hands, not of the party, but of a few cliques at the top, which dictate their law to the party. There is the same depoliticization of those who are ruled (and of most of the party members themselves, who are reduced to the role of implementers). To the extent that there are differences in the two systems, they lie mainly in the social sphere—in China for example, inequality is less pronounced and the privileges of the cadres are more limited and ambiguous (a subject to which we will return shortly).

As far as the political sphere is concerned, Mao's innovations are a mark of failure, of a malfunctioning of the system. Mao's worries are more than justified. His quasi-cures (even when they entail an upheaval as chancy as the Cultural Revolution) are inoperative. The logic of the system prevails over the reformist velleities of a chief who is more sensitive and adept at reading the signs than are his fraternal enemies to the north. Maoism does not resolve the contradictions of Leninism; it is content to expose them when others would hide them. It constitutes, not a viable substitute for Leninism, but a reflection of the guilty conscience of the "revolutionary" bureaucrats.

Having looked at the power expressed in China's international relations and guaranteed by her internal order, let us now examine the Communist regime's quest for wealth—*i.e.*, the course of economic development or "socialist construction," and the demographic constraints involved. In this sphere, too, the changes are spectacular, even if less fundamental and less decisive than is often claimed. China now has a modern industrial sector, much broader than in the Kuomintang era, furnishing a solid base for future development. Agriculture passed the "take-off" point in the 1960's and, in the most advanced areas, seems to be freeing itself from the uncertainties of climate. The annual growth of China's gross national product, while quite uneven, has nevertheless come close to—if not reached—an average of 4 percent,[1] higher than that of most other underdeveloped countries.

If the standard of living is not much higher than in 1936 (the last "normal" year before the Japanese invasion and the civil war), it is more equally distributed—now, moreover, among 800 million persons as against some 500 million on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war. Population growth, which has

[1] See Dwight H. Perkins, "Looking Inside China: An Economic Reappraisal," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1973, p. 5.

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absorbed at least half of the gains in production, has itself been accelerated by the spread of hygiene and medical care. The much larger cohorts which are reaching or will soon reach the age of reproduction will, for a time, limit the effects of a birth control program which was slow in getting started but now appears to be gaining good ground. The next 10 or 15 years are likely to constitute a most critical phase because of the conjunction of the fragile emergence of the economy from its initial development stage and the threat of a population explosion not yet forcefully contained. Common in the Third World, this combination is the more fearsome in China because of the masses involved, which give it spectacular dimensions. One can only hope that the economic progress already achieved, as well as a resolute and egalitarian policy on the part of government, will spare "People's China" from the famine which plagues other, less crowded states.

By comparison with other areas of the world threatened with starvation, the PRC, in its policies of economic development and birth control, seems to be headed in the right direction. The leaders appear to have learned the lessons of past failures, which were sometimes costly and not always unavoidable. If objectives as fundamental as the production of chemical fertilizers or the lowering of the birth rate did not initially get the priority which they are now accorded, this was certainly the result of a deep-rooted dogmatism carried over from the past. From the pro-natalist professions of faith of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek to those of Mao Tse- tung in September 1949,[2] or to the abrupt stand *Jen-min Jih-pao* took in 1952 denouncing the "hyprocrisy" of birth control as a "means of killing off the Chinese people without shedding blood," [3] one can trace through the regimes of this country a continuous chauvinistic line whose rash certitudes may have served the capture of power, but not its exercise.

In the case of chemical fertilizer production, the initial neglect was due not so much to any indirect impact of anti-imperialistic attitudes as to the Mao regime's undue attention to the then available revolutionary model, namely the Stalinist strategy of development. The selective priority accorded to, and applied within, heavy industry held back whole sectors of the same heavy industry, including the production of nitrate fertilizer, the servant of a neglected agriculture. An excess of nationalist passion and too much humility in adopting an imported model—far from being contradictory, these two passions complemented and compensated for one another. The corrections made over the last 16 or 17 years in the once-servile imitation of the foreign experience have not so far, to say the least, been paralleled by a moderation of China's intolerant nationalism. The probable reason is that the initial effects of the corrections have been too unconvincing or uneven to permit Chinese national pride, so long humiliated, to unbend.

The important point, in any case, is that the Chinese did not stubbornly pursue an unsuitable policy, even though renunciation of it led initially to failure and disaster. But the failure (the first major birth-control campaign, in 1957) and the disaster (the Great Leap of 1957-58) clearly signified that a break with the past, while necessary, was not enough; it could at best—and only if it was absolute —represent a preliminary step. In breaking spectacularly with the previous development strategy, the Great Leap still amounted to no more than a half-hearted emancipation from the underlying commitment to the priority development of industry, which continued to receive the lion's share of state investment. As for the anti-natalist efforts of 1957, they only enabled the leadership to realize the true magnitude of the cultural and economic obstacles facing the diffusion of contraceptive practices and techniques.

The succession of policies which have been tested and/or implemented in the economic and demographic spheres during the last 15 years have amounted to a series of corrections applied to the initial corrections of 1957-58. The current product of these multiple modifications—*i.e.*, the economic and demographic strategy pursued without major interruption since the end of the Cultural Revolution —is, by comparison with the Great Leap and the 1957 anti-natalist campaign, not only more cautious and sophisticated but also better suited to Chinese conditions.

Careful retouchings or laborious modifications inspired, indeed imposed, by failure and difficulties

[2] Mao stated: "Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution—the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus—that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population—was not only thoroughly refuted in theory by Marxists long ago but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China *after their liberation*." See "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," Sept. 16, 1949, tr. in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, International Publishers, New York, Vol. 5, p. 453.

[3] (Peking), April 25, 1952.

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—these have brought us far from the real beginnings and radical originality claimed for Maoism. When we look at the innovations most frequently cited to illustrate that originality (which is real but hardly radical), the pertinent test ultimately comes down to how long they have lasted, *i.e.*, their viability. Unlike such still-born novelties as close sowing, deep planting, and the small backyard iron-smelting furnaces of the Great Leap era, there are diverse and successful practices and institutions like barefoot doctors, delayed marriage, an accelerated school curriculum geared toward practical work, and an industrial decentralization that increases in the countryside the supply of simple equipment requiring little capital and many hands—all of which represent ingenious responses to scarcity. Cheap and designed above all for the rural masses, most of these measures reflect an egalitarian ideology, but that is not the main point. They are sensible recipes that are neither antitheses nor substitutes but rather ideologically-tinged complements to the more classical means of achieving progress recommended by the drab "experts." Despite the endless criticism directed at the latter, the two streams had to unite. Thus, with the exception of the scarlet revolution of 1966-67 (the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), it is a rather mixed, colorless alloy which seems to have been able to stand the test of time for some 15 years. From Liu Shao-ch'i to Chou En-lai, and from a Teng Hsiao-p'ing indifferent to the "color of the cat" [4] to Teng Hsiao-p'ing today, this blend has permitted both the economic recovery of 1962-65 and the progress of the last decade in agriculture.

It was, after all, only after the rural sector finally garnered the huge modern investments long denied it—*i.e.*, chemical fertilizers, irrigation, mechanization, and seed selection—that Chinese agriculture took off decisively. To this day, modern agriculture has only really taken hold in the most developed regions (the deltas, plains, and valleys of the East, the Southeast, and the Center), which have enjoyed a privileged status in this technological transformation. This could only be accomplished by sacrificing egalitarian distribution of investments and, even more, by foregoing a distribution (of Maoist inspiration) which would have favored the underdeveloped zones of the interior. Today, Chinese agriculture combines a modern sector of relatively high and stable yields and comprising about one-fifth of the cultivated lands in the country and a traditional sector growing at a pace which is slower than that of the population—slower and less regular, for in this China, agriculture is still subject to the vagaries of climate.[5]



Chinese peasants provide the power for a simple irrigation mechanism in this scene photographed in August 1972 near Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Tse-tung.

—Carlo Leidl/Black Star.

[4] During the dark years following the failure of the Great Leap, Teng had justified a policy which relied on private, individual incentives in the following words: "No matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches the mouse." See Joint Publication Research Service, *Reports* (Washington, DC), No. 41,450, June 19, 1967, quoting a statement reportedly made by Teng in 1962.

[5] See Benedict Stavis, "China's Green Revolution," mimeographed, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

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How then is one, in the final analysis, to characterize the contribution of Maoist recipes to the growth of production? Heavily reliant upon technology, these prescriptions cannot be dissociated from expertise, specialization, and inequality.

This has not prevented the leaders of a self-professed "social" revolution, who have already abolished the most crying inequalities inherited from the past, from combating the inequalities introduced by economic development; quite the contrary. At the same time, the fact that this revolution sees itself as "social" in nature does not prevent it from being first and foremost "national." Thus, the balance sheet in matters of social change (as in the sphere of economic policies) is more ambiguous than it is in the areas of national and state power.

The most notable social transformation remains that brought about by the land reform undertaken in the first years of the regime: the abolition of tenancy and the confiscation and redistribution of the land and goods of the landlords abruptly terminated the secular domination of that element of Chinese society. From the viewpoint of the majority of peasants (who constitute between three-fourths and four-fifths of all Chinese), the subsequent collectivization greatly compromised the benefits of that ephemeral emancipation. In effect, it took away from them with one hand what had just been given them by the other and, through the imposition of compulsory deliveries at low prices, virtually turned them into tenant farmers of the state. Inasmuch as, before 1949, there were not only tenant farmers but also small private cultivators (as well as a quite common intermediate category of those who owned fields too small to assure the family's subsistence and had to secure the indispensable complement by cultivating land rented from a landlord), conditions had indeed been equalized, but by leveling them downward. The private plots which were left at the disposal of each member of the agricultural cooperatives—and later of the people's communes—came to be cherished every bit as much as the family fields of yesteryear, which the peasants had always taken great pains to cling to. Only the plots were tinier than most of the microfarms of the pre-Liberation era, and whereas under the old regime farmers had the feeling (if largely illusory) that work, thrift, and luck (*i.e.*, the absence of natural or human catastrophe) would enable them to keep and—who knows?—even enlarge their holdings, members of the cooperatives and communes have learned from experience that the destiny of their private plots (their size and even their very existence) depends entirely on the caprice of a power almost as difficult to influence as the former village despot with his strawmen.

And yet this power is very sensitive to the inequalities still afflicting the rural population and very concerned about reducing them. Some of its representatives, in view of the immensity of the task, may well be tempted to resign themselves to such continuing inequalities. But they must reckon with the relentless injunctions of Mao himself, whose concern with abolishing the "three great differences" (or inequalities)—between city and countryside, between worker and peasant, and between intellectual work and manual labor—imposes itself on any person wielding a bit of authority. To tell the truth, the periodic directives that Mao has inspired to this end have thus far concerned mainly peripheral, albeit important, sectors, *e.g.*, education and public health. They have not yet been aimed at making the rewards for agricultural work a little more commensurate with the wealth that it creates. The income and purchasing power of the members of the rural communes remain much lower than those of the privileged minority, which includes urban workers. "Primitive accumulation" of capital is financed to a large measure by the labor of the peasants, who to boot have practically no hope of seeing their children escape the curse of the land.

This last is true because the urban sector already creates too few jobs to provide employment for every urban citizen. Such pressures alone would seem to justify sending graduates of urban educational institutions to the countryside. But in addition, it is the shrewd calculation—or vision—of the planners to have these potential urban unemployed devote their talents, their competence, and their faith to transforming the existence and work of the villagers. The trouble is that talents and competence are not always equal to the task; that the faith imparted and nurtured, probably to excess, by propaganda is seldom great enough to enable a transplanted urban youth to tolerate the desolate backwardness of the village; and finally that the rustics thus "assisted" grumble at receiving a reinforcement they did not ask for—another mouth to feed in return for a pair of weak and clumsy arms.

There is no irony, no implicit criticism, intended here—both would be unjust and inappropriate. That a policy which makes virtue out of necessity has, in its initial phase, created more problems than it

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has solved does not negate its underlying principle. So far as application of the policy is concerned, one can identify some of the preconditions—not yet realized—for the success of the undertaking: for example, it is necessary that the faith of the young "volunteers" headed for the interior not be undermined by the feeling that they were sent as a result of an arbitrary decision or an act of fate, or worse, as a punishment. In any case—like most of the measures aimed at narrowing the gap between town and countryside, or at least preventing it from widening at the same rapid and disorderly pace as in the Third World—this policy is, in its conception, one of the very few which seems capable of going beyond the scope of *fu-chiang* without contradicting its legitimate requirements.

Without going into a lengthy analysis of the problems of the privileged few who do not work on the land, we should note that the quest for equality touches them too. Alongside the peasants, the other pillar of Chinese society today is not, or is not yet, the proletariat, although its size is growing with the progress of industrialization; rather, it is the heterogeneous universe of the cadres, who are the heirs of the scholar-mandarins of the past. China's "New Class" is not only more deeply rooted in national tradition than its European or Soviet counterparts; it is also less privileged and up till now has had to lead a more laborious—or less parasitic—existence in order to earn more niggardly and precarious advantages. Not only between different levels of workers but also between workers and technicians or engineers within the same enterprise, wage differentials are much less pronounced than in the USSR, where they are only now being reduced and where the living standards of kolkhoz members are just beginning to rise toward the level enjoyed by urban dwellers. The leaders of the PRC have shown themselves less inclined to live with levels of inequality that are already less flagrant than those prevailing in Soviet society.

So much for the power of the nation and of the state and the problems of the economy and society; thus far we have left ideology aside. But here, too, one can discern strong elements of continuity. Kowtowing, for example, is still *de rigueur:* Confucianism continues to be denounced, but they have forgotten to abolish the rituals. This is to say that the new orthodoxy is an extension of the ancient one even while going against it. Both have imposed a ubiquitous cultural conformism. In truth, the present orthodoxy is even more omnipresent than that of the past, but it is likely to prove that much more transitory. There is nothing surprising in the fact that they are still criticizing Confucius a quarter of a century after the Liberation. It will still be necessary to continue the de-Confucianization of China long after the task of de-Maoization has been completed.

Even before de-Maoization has been officially promoted, it has already made its way into the hearts and minds of many Chinese. The contemporaries of the current *Pi Lin Pi Kung* (Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius) campaign appear more cynical than those of the Cultural Revolution. The vicissitudes of that earlier upheaval and its epilogue in 1971 (which culminated in the disappearance and disgrace of Lin Piao) can hardly have failed to swell the ranks of the skeptics.

It is possible that many Chinese remain bound to their leaders by a tacit contract whereby they offer their obedience in exchange for the leaders' assurances of national greatness and of an irreducible minimum standard of living. But this passivity does not, perhaps, exclude a growing impatience, not with authority *per se,* but with its caprices or what are perceived as such—the repeated campaigns and "movements" (*yun-tung*), whose efficacy is in any case constantly diminishing. If this lesson is learned, we may suppose that the regime will itself increasingly refrain from periodic actions that jeopardize order, continuity, and routine. There would then remain little on the agenda for the bureaucratic heirs of the octogenarian Prophet other than the traditional pursuit of *fu-chiang* and the unequal distribution of its dividends among the different classes of a society consolidating its hierarchical structure.

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A View from the Village

By Mark Gayn

The opening item in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* as issued in 1951 and since, is an "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society." First published in 1926 in *Chung-kuo Nung-jen,* then the organ of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, it is a curious work—naive, untidy, and decidedly un-Marxist. What is not widely known is that nearly a half-century ago it provoked the first published Soviet criticism of Mao.

The criticism came from a leading aide of Mikhail Borodin, head of the Soviet advisory group in Canton in the mid-1920's. The mission, which at one point numbered three-score members, included a high-powered peasant section headed by M. Volin, a noted Soviet historian and Sinologist. In September 1926, the advisory group's mimeographed house organ *Canton* carried a review of Mao's work by "V-n"—as Volin signed himself.[1]

Mao's essay divided Chinese society into five major classes—big, middle, and petty capitalists, semi-proletariat, and proletariat—and further broke each of these down into smaller categories. Among the latter was the "unemployed proletariat," which Mao defined as consisting mainly of yesterday's peasants and artisans who had become bandits, along with soldiers, beggars, and prostitutes. Most of them, he added, are "organized in secret societies and, being courageous and determined, may under certain circumstances become a considerable force in the revolution." Mao put the total population of China as of that time at 400 million, and on the basis of his own analysis he estimated that "we have 395 million friends, one million undoubted enemies, and four million undecided persons, who may be our friends or foes. But even if they all became enemies of the revolution, they would still—together with the big capitalists—form a front of only five millions, which of course could never withstand 395 million people."

"V-n" was less than kind to this still obscure leader of China's infant Communist party. One of Mao's defects, he noted, was carelessness with figures, for the 1922 postal census put China's population at 456 millions. Worse was Mao's "more than just arbitrary" division of Chinese society into his various categories: Mao treated this society as if it were a developed capitalist system. Actually, according to "V-n," it was still burdened with remnants of semi-feudalism, a characteristic reflected in the class structure.

When the essay reappeared in Mao's *Selected Works* in 1951, it bore signs of extensive surgery. Gone were the dubious statistics that had troubled Volin. Gone were some of the subgroups, including the brigands and prostitutes. Passages had been deleted and others inserted. The Central Committee's editorial group responsible for the revisions insisted that the 1926 essay had really been intended to combat the two wicked "deviations" that then afflicted the party: the "rightist deviation" of the party's first leader, Chen Tu-hsiu, and the "leftist deviation" of Chang Kuo-t'ao. This explanation was at best dubious, for in its original form the essay made no reference to either Chen or Chang.

Today, on rereading the original, one is struck by two things. The first is that the essay paid only

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[1] *Canton,* originally titled *Bolshevik in Canton,* was published in an edition of 100. Information on it, and on Volin, is available in V. V. Vishniakova-Akimova's memoir, *Dva goda v vosstavshem Kitae, 1925-27* (Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-27), Moscow, Nauka, 1965. Volin's article has been reproduced and analyzed by one of the leading Soviet Sinologists of today, Lev Deliusin, in *Voprosi filosofii* (Moscow), No. 6, 1969, pp. 128-29.

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the most cursory lip service to standard Marxist—or even Comintern—doctrine. There was, to be sure, mention of the industrial worker as the main motive force of revolution, but it was hardly more than casual. Indeed, it seems quite clear that Mao was looking at Chinese society from the vantage point of the village. His proletariat appeared to consist mainly of the poor and dispossessed members of the peasantry; most of his capitalists were landlords.

The same point of view was apparent in Mao's famous "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan." Tucked away in the original 1927 version of the report was this telltale sentence: "To give credits where they are due, if we allot ten points to the accomplishments of the democratic revolution, then the achievements of the urban dwellers and the military units rate only three points, while the remaining seven points should go to the peasants, in their rural revolution." [2] Not surprisingly, this sentence, too, was deleted from the editions of Mao's works published in 1951 and later. Presumably these excisions were made because it was essential to affirm Mao's loyalty to Marx and Lenin, and to establish his claim to be a true political heir to these two great men. But while Mao beyond doubt borowed heavily from both and adapted their ideas—or what he took to be their ideas—to the reality he knew, he also borrowed heavily from many other sources, ranging from Adam Smith to the celebrated 18th-century Chinese novel *Dream of the Red Chamber,* adapting or modifying what he found useful and discarding what he found irrelevant. But if he was constant in anything, it was in placing the village at the center of his world.

Roughly two decades after the appearance of these very early writings of Mao, I had a number of interviews with the Chinese leader at the Communists' Yenan base in February 1947. Rereading my notes of these encounters, I find in them no record of any reference by Mao to Karl Marx. Mao did have the works of Marx and Engels, of Lenin and Plekhanov, in the rickety bookcase that stood in his sparsely-furnished hillside cave, but these men and their ideas remained unmentioned in our conversations. Mao saw his movement not as a by-product of the Western revolutionary tradition but as a lineal successor to the peasant upheavals that had rocked China through 2,000 years. He was thoroughly immersed in this long record of social violence; he knew both its heroes and its villains, as well as the errors which had doomed all the peasant revolts of the past. Without boastfulness but as if it was quite natural and obvious, he placed himself alongside these rebels of Chinese history, to whom he saw himself as spiritual kin. A certain peasant leader, Mao explained, failed because he allowed himself to be corrupted by the enemy; another, because he had no consistent strategy, sound organization, or appealing political doctrine. Where their revolutions failed, Mao insisted, his would succeed because it had a political philosophy, a disciplined and vigorous political party, and tested leadership.

Mao during a tour of Communist-held rural areas in Yenan around 1948.

—Magnum.

[2] As translated in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952. The authors apparently translated the essay from the 1944 edition of Mao's works, published in Shantung.

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It was also clear from these conversations in Yenan that Mao idealized the peasants who had followed him through his 22 years of bitter and bloody struggle. He pictured the rural villager as the foremost repository of revolutionary virtues—of a spirit of self-denial and a sense of discipline, of integrity, loyalty, steadfastness, and courage. At least in my mind, there was no doubt that Mao saw in many of his peasant soldiers a reincarnation of the heroes of the Chinese classics he had devoured as a youth—including even highwaymen. (Indeed, three bandit units and their chieftains had been incorporated into the small force assembled by Mao in the Chingkang Mountains of Kiangsi Province in the late 1920's.) Quite obviously, in Mao's eyes the peasants *were* the real heroes of the Communists' long struggle, the most skillful guerrillas, the toughest and most enduring fighters, the truest revolutionaries.

The village continued to be Mao's spiritual habitat—and one of his main preoccupations—even after the Communists assumed central power in Peking in 1949. His entire view of China was colored by the belief that the backwardness of the countryside and its 550-600 millon peasants was the greatest brake on China's progress and development as a major power. He feared the widening of the gap between the primitive village and the modern, comfortable, increasingly soft and corrupt city. He distrusted the intellectuals and the bureaucrats, for they were urban creatures who looked down on the peasants or ignored them. During my visit to Yenan in 1947, I stood in the room in the Central Committee building where, back in 1942, Mao had sharply lectured to the intellectuals drawn to this barren corner of the northwest by their idealism. He exhorted them to stop dabbling in abstract art, dissonant music, and literature that went over the heads of the Shensi peasant. Almost a third of a century later, Mao's attitude toward, and his treatment of, the intellectuals remain unchanged.

The Cultural Revolution of 1966-68 was a many-faceted affair. Above all, it was a titanic intraparty struggle for power, but among its key facets was a series of momentous debates centering on the issue of the relative importance of the urban and rural segments of the population in China's national development. Enough is known to suggest that one of these debates saw grouped loosely on one side some powerful urban party leaders who believed that China could advance to greatness only by creating an intellectual elite with high academic qualifications, by giving authority to the technocrats and managers, and by stressing use of material incentives. On the other side was Mao, who insisted that the key to China's advance lay in bringing the millions of rural villagers out of the 17th century into the 20th.

It is noteworthy that the full fury of the Cultural Revolution was turned on the cities, while the countryside was spared. Equally significant is the fact that, as by-products of the upheaval, the transfer of urban cadres to the country became institutionalized through the creation of the "May 7th Schools"; the transplantation of urban "young intellectuals" to the villages was greatly stepped up; and the rural health services were vastly expanded not only by the addition of a million "barefoot doctors" but also by the assignment of thousands of trained physicians and medical students—and even of entire medical schools—to the villages for periods of six months or more. It was not only a great internal migration; it was also, at least in part, a massive transfusion of urban literacy and skills into the veins of rural China, with a potential long-range impact that can hardly be measured at the moment.

It could be argued that in his almost obsessive emphasis on the village Mao was running against the tide of history, and that by dispersing the intellectual elite he was actually retarding China's progress. It can hardly be denied that the economic and technological gap between China and, say, Japan continued to widen with each year that these policies were prolonged. But on the other hand, Mao could argue persuasively that China's overall progress would continue to be slow so long as the countryside remained backward. Of what worth are an intellectual elite and a sophisticated industry, he could ask, if in much of China's vast interior not even bullocks and donkeys but human beings still pull ploughs?

The People's Republic is now 25 years old, and it seems a good time to ask what Mao has achieved in the countryside and how durable those achievements are likely to be.

Perhaps the most significant achievement has been the creation in the countryside, as in the towns, of a more equitable system of social justice. For all the occasional remaining disparities, there are probably few, if any, societies more egalitarian than China's today. There are no concentrations of wealth in urban or rural China, no conspicuous consumption—and no ragged women and children begging in the streets as they once did by the thousands in every major city. In one rural commune after another, I

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

Terraced fields constructed from barren hills by the model Tachai Production Brigade of Shansi Province, shown in September 1970.

—EUPRA.

was told of the existence of a social welfare fund, amounting to about five percent of total communal income, to help the aged, widows with large families, and the chronically ill, as well as to finance the local public health service. This welfare concept is almost unique in Asia (except for the Soviet Asiatic republics). In the past, the only social insurance in the Chinese countryside was provided by the family, and it was too bad if a family was too poor to provide for its own members in case of illness or misfortune. The new system is far more equitable and therefore likely to endure.

Another achievement has been the growth in the countryside of a new sense of national solidarity and pride. Like the urban Chinese, the peasants have been given an injection of nationalism. True, this has been tinged now and then with xenophobia; true, too, for many rural inhabitants China still does not extend beyond the commune limits. But for a very large proportion of the rural population—especially the young, who enjoyed a remarkable degree of mobility during the Cultural Revolution—Han nationalism has become a powerful emotional force that may help to ensure national cohesion in the crises of tomorrow. To countless Chinese, Mao has given the opportunity and the urge to discover their own land and take pride in its accomplishments.

Mao's third major achievement in the rural areas has been the creation of an effective, honest, and tough-minded rural administration. While the leadership in Peking has grown infirm with age, in the countryside there has been great fluidity, making for constant renewal with younger blood. I have visited upwards of 20 communes in North, Central, and South China in the course of five trips to the People's Republic since 1965. In all these communes, authority rested in the hands of professional party cadres, mostly in their thirties and usually assigned by the county party apparatus. They were articulate, dedicated, and well-versed in agricultural matters, but they were even better-versed in the techniques of governing, of social organization and indoctrination. Never did I see any signs of an easy camaraderie between these professional administrators and the ordinary tillers of the soil; nor was there much evidence of that rural democracy which seems to have beguiled so many visitors to China. The peasants did have their fleeting moment of glory in 1966-68 when, in each commune and production brigade, a few officials—with county sanction—were exposed to public criticism and even abuse. But that time is gone. In a typical commune in Kwangtung Province, the chairman and the party secretary told me that they performed 40 days of manual labor in the fields annually ("as Charman Mao has instructed"), but this did not seem to have altered their governors-to-governed relationship with the peasants. Nor did it diminish the fact that the rank-and-file members of the commune had no say in choosing these administrators.

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But whether those who run the communes are chosen democratically or not, the fact remains that the present rural administration of China is an effective tool of social, political, and economic management, and one that is constantly being watched by the party network for signs of corruption and inefficiency—or of excessive abrasiveness. Mao put a great deal of thought and care into the shaping of this apparatus, for he saw it destined to play a crucial role in the realization of his vision of a new and revitalized China. In this vast country, with its burgeoning population and relatively meager natural wealth, he looked upon manpower as a vital resource which must be exploited to the fullest if China was to achieve its development goals. To do this, the rural masses had to be mobilized and motivated, and this in turn required a vigorous and capable rural administration quickly responsive to Peking's command.

Such an administration is now functioning, and the results in the countryside have been impressive. From Inner Mongolia on the north to Kwangtung on the south, and as far west as Shensi, I have seen many striking examples of what well-directed manpower could achieve. There was, for instance, a reservoir—virtually an inland sea—which 20,000 workers, toiling in one-month shifts, had shoveled out of a barren valley in Shansi. When I saw it, the reservoir already had a hydroelectric plant that powered irrigation pumps for many miles around. The reservoir was richly stocked with fish, and for the first time the peasant youths in the area were learning to swim. The whole pattern of life in the region had changed, better crops were being raised, the homes had electric lighting, and incomes were rising. After Mao dies, this nationwide system of reservoirs and irrigation canals, of small power stations providing energy for village workshops, and of flood-control dikes, will remain as a memorial to him—a memorial as impressive as the Great Wall, and far more useful.

Finally, Mao has accomplished much in ensuring that the countryside can produce enough foodstuffs to feed both the rural and urban populations. Illustrative of how this was achieved was the experience of the Tom Tong Commune in Kwangtung Province. The details were supplied to me in the office of one of the commune's production brigades by the brigade chairman, who was also its party secretary. A silent witness to the conversation was a large gilded bust of Mao. The chairman told me that before 1949 the rice paddies (then known fatalistically as "dependent on heaven" fields) in the area had produced 1,800 catties [3] per acre. By 1960, the yield had risen to nearly 4,300 catties; by 1969, to nearly 5,000; and by 1975 the brigade chairman expected the figure to soar to 12,000 catties. This had been accomplished by rigorously mobilizing the commune's 33,000 people to construct 150 water-control projects, including large reservoirs with seven hydroelectric stations; by building roads and storage sheds; by initiating a seed-selection program; and by imposing tight administrative controls.

Thanks to the water-control projects, the commune was able to deal with floods and droughts reasonably well. And even though annual incomes were still pathetically low by Western standards (120 yuan, or roughly $56 at the 1972 exchange rate, per working person, with 60 percent paid in grain, salt, and cooking oil), there were such evidences of relative well-being as 150 bicycles and 40 sewing machines in a brigade with 304 households. Most important, the amount of grain delivered to the state had been rising steadily.

But these four achievements—the creation of a more equitable pattern of social justice, the establishment of an honest and capable rural administration, the more effective use of rural manpower, and the attainment of self-sufficiency in food—are not the sum total of Mao's imprint on rural China. The peasant's psyche has been affected, no less than that of the city dweller, by Mao's moralistic preachments. New patterns of behavior based on integrity, subordination of the interests of the individual to the public weal, self-reliance, and discipline have begun to take hold. I was told of occasional crime in the countryside, but there is clearly less of it than one would find in any other country on the Asian mainland. Selfishness may still persist, but it must be concealed, for its exposure before the public eye is a cruel experience.

There are deep moral flaws in any totalitarian society, and Mao's is as totalitarian as they come. (For example, my conversations with "rusticated youths" and with people in the "May 7th Schools" produced an image of utter official indifference to the individual's right to some private life of his own.) But no Asian country honors the ten commandments—as rewritten by Mao—quite as much as China, and this new morality may well survive its creator.

[3] One catty equals approximately 1⅓ pounds.

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Mao has for years been striving to assure that the changes he has wrought will survive him—as the saying went during the Cultural Revolution—"for a hundred, a thousand, nay, ten thousand years." He has changed political heirs and stirred up fearsome political upheavals to prevent detours from the path he charted. He has had hundreds of millions memorize his essays on "Serving the People" and "The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains" in order to deepen the new morality, and he has humbled the bureaucrats to check arrogance. At 81, his mind is not as active as it once was, but it still searches restlessly for ways to perpetuate his ideas lest his revolution fail like the peasant uprisings of the past.

The big difficulty for Mao—or for the outsider seeking to assess the impact of Mao's achievements—lies in the complexity of China's rural society. The peasants are torn between traditional attitudes and ethics and the new morality of Mao. They may chant anti-Confucian slogans in public, but their domestic regimen is, perhaps unknowingly, still influenced by the old sage's teachings. There are conflicts between poor peasants and the less poor over the allocation of private plots and of work points; between the old and the young; between the peasants and the urban interlopers—the students and cadres—thrust upon them; between the peasants and the rural administrators. The village is not yet a world of pure and profound harmony, but one of continuing if often hidden tensions.

Indeed, there have been numerous indications that discontent continues to plague the society, however more equitable the social order today than it was before 1949. During the Cultural Revolution, when political controls broke down in many areas, there were instances in which peasants divided grain crops among themselves, leaving little for the commune reserves, appropriated communal pigs and chickens, or chopped down commune forests. A more recent hint of strains has been the issuance of strict directives to the communes to take better care of the resettled "young intellectuals," to provide them with more grain and better housing. In some of the communes I visited, the attitude was that the youths had been sent in to be "reeducated through manual labor"—and the labor they were put to was truly of the most strenuous or demeaning kind. Instead of welcoming them as literates whose skills the villages badly needed, the peasants seemed to resent the newcomers as extra mouths to feed. The result has been that hundreds of thousands of resettled youths—one estimate puts the number at 400,000 [4]—have fled from the countryside to the cities; and thousands of others have been fleeing to Hong Kong in the face of all the perils of Chinese shore patrols and China Sea sharks.[5] The latter refugees have been telling tales of rural scarcity and discontent.

What, then, of the future? If the transfer of power after Mao's death proves reasonably smooth, if central authority remains firm and the rural administration continues to function without disruption, then the villages are likely to go on for many years along the paths charted by Mao. If, on the other hand, another upheaval comparable to that of 1966-68 occurs, some of the Maoist implantations in the countryside may be eroded. Still, I am convinced that so profound has been Mao's imprint on rural China—on its modes of living and producing and on the way it is governed—that the effects will continue to be felt for many generations after he has passed away.

[4] A senior Western diplomat in Peking gave this estimate in a conversation with the author.

[5] A news item in *The New York Times*, reprinted in the Toronto *Globe & Mail*, Aug. 10, 1974, reported that 2,833 illegal Chinese immigrants reached Hong Kong in the first six months of this year. It added: "The Immigration Department, which operates on the theory that the police statistics should generally be multiplied by three, estimated that 8,230 people escaped in the first half of the year."

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A Radical Break with the Past

By Edward E. Rice

The restoration of territorial unity to mainland China by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 rounded out a recurrent historical cycle and verified once again a saying of the ancients. They had observed that the empire when united tended ever to divide, and when divided strove ever to unite. However, the revolution that has reached its zenith under the Communists is the only one in China since the revolution of Shih Huang Ti (221-210 B.C.) that has changed the system of government and altered the configuration of society.

It was Shih Huang Ti's revolution that created the centralized empire, and it has been the post-1911 revolution, now presided over by the Communists,[1] that has overthrown it and entered China upon a new era. By depriving the aristocracy of their hereditary lands and transporting them from the regions in which they had exercised power, Shih Huang Ti dealt feudalism a blow from which it was never to recover. The redistribution of agricultural lands, carried out shortly after the establishment of the present Communist government and accompanied by the killing of several million people, similarly destroyed the landed gentry, a class analogous to the aristocracy of feudal China.

Shih Huang Ti ordered the burning of the Confucian classics and the burying alive of Confucian scholars because they advocated a return to the governing principles of the feudal past, whereas he ruled his Ch'in empire in accordance with the principles of the rival Legalist school of political philosophers.[2] The results of his efforts to exorcise Confucianism proved impermanent, perhaps because Confucianism reflected the basic ways of Chinese society too accurately to be rooted out under his short-lived dynasty. Since the early years of this century, those Chinese who have advocated basic changes in their society have attacked Confucianism as an obstacle to progress, and even today in China, Confucius is the target of a campaign of criticism said to have been launched by Chairman Mao himself. In this campaign, Shih Huang Ti—long held in disrepute for the ruthlessness of his rule—is being represented as a progressive and admirable figure.

The Ch'in created a powerful state by means of a high degree of organization under a bureaucracy which imposed severe discipline on behalf of an absolutist emperor. Mao Tse-tung and his fellow leaders, ruling through a similarly powerful bureaucracy (except during the aberrant period of the Cultural Revolution), have been committed to the goal of transforming China into a strong, modern, socialist country. China is, in other words, to be restored to greatness through modern development carried out in accordance with the socialist principles of Marxism-Leninism. It is this adherence to Marxism, with its implied commitment to an eventual

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[1] The collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 marked the beginning of a complex struggle during which parliamentary rule from Peking and Chinese unity were early victims. In this struggle, the principal contenders were militarist organizations— Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang and the emergent Chinese Communist Party, with which Sun allied the Kuomintang early in 1924. The back of warlord power was broken by the Northern Expedition of the Soviet-trained and -equipped Kuomintang armies, launched in 1925 under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. With the initiation of his anti-Communist purge in 1927, a new civil war broke out. Its first phase ended in 1936, when the two parties again entered into collaboration to resist Japan, and its second phase, which commenced after Japan's defeat in 1945, ended with the Communist triumph in 1949.

[2] Unlike the Confucianists, who viewed the moral example of rulers as the central factor determining the tone and behavior of society as a whole, the Legalists stressed the importance of a fixed body of laws, to be firmly administered by a highly organized state bureaucracy.

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transition from socialism to communism, which gives the present regime its most distinctive features.

In the China of Shih Huang Ti's era, the new bureaucrats supplanted the feudal lords as links between local societies and the sovereign. With the founding of the People's Republic of China, the gentry's similar role was assumed by the cadres of the new regime. As Communist parties have done elsewhere, the Chinese Communist Party set up complex organizational structures which permeated all of society. Through these structures, the party proceeded to mobilize the masses to play an active and continuous role in the pursuit of its multitudinous objectives. While the party leadership regarded ideological indoctrination of the people themselves as one of the most important of these objectives, it believed that even before this indoctrination had been accomplished, popular participation in mass campaigns would lead to commitment to the party's aims, and hence to the Communist regime.

Shih Huang Ti had employed large bodies of people for the construction of trunk roads and of the Great Wall, and successor regimes, both dynastic and republican, had recurrently mobilized them for a variety of public works. However, the traditional relationship between the populace and its rulers was well summed up in the old Chinese saying: "Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away." With the coming of the party and its cadres, that saying lost all relevance.

If the most noteworthy of the changes brought about by Communist rule has been popular involvement and participation, the most striking aspect of its operational method has been reliance upon campaigns. As one cadre expalined shortly after the establishment of the new government, these mass movements were to follow one another endlessly, like waves beating upon the shore.[3] His prediction has been fulfilled by the history of Chinese Communist rule, which may be divided into chapters, each devoted to a movement and the period in which that movement constituted the dominant element.

The Ch'in rulers, after depriving the feudal lords of the land, turned its ownership over to the peasants who had been cultivating it. The mass movement conducted against the landlords shortly after the founding of the present Peking government had as one of its immediate aims an analogous goal—the redistribution among peasant households of the fields being seized from landlord proprietors. However, unlike the peasants of the earlier era, the peasants of the Communist period were not destined to keep their newly acquired land long enough to become accustomed to its ownership. By participating in the killing of the landlords and the burning of old title deeds, they burned their bridges to the past. When Communist cadres launched the next great campaign affecting land tenure, the peasants proved unable either to protect their new acquisitions or to retain their old holdings.

A drawing of Shih Huang Ti (259-210 B.C.), founder of the powerful Ch'in Dynasty, who is currently being viewed by the Chinese Communists as a "progressive" figure in China's history.

—China Pictorial (Peking), No. 6, 1974, p. 30.

Sun Yat-sen, the prophet of China's republican revolution, once complained that the Chinese people were like a loose tray of sand. While it is true that Chinese society in his day lacked a unifying cement, individual Chinese did not then or traditionally re-

[3] Based upon a personal interview with a refugee, who recounted the cadre's statement to explain his own decision to leave China.

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semble loose grains of sand. Rather, the individual was at the center of a web of mutually supportive relationships. Immediately surrounding him was the extended family—usually consisting either of a single household or of several households in close proximity—with its own hierarchical arrangement of authority. Individuals were also typically linked by a variety of organizational and other relationships —*e.g.,* relationships based on common local origins, shared schooling experiences, involvement in the same occupation, as well as on friendships, sometimes solidified by an oath of brotherhood or by acceptance of an important favor. This family-centered society reflected Confucian precepts, which assumed that society would be in harmony as long as its sets of personal relationships, beginning with those of the family and culminating with those between the ruler and his ministers, were properly ordered and maintained.

A society so organized, however, is one in which authority is diffused and not readily susceptible to concentration; moreover, giving precedence to personal relationships tends to undercut loyalty to large and hence impersonal organizations. In theory, if much less so in practice, the Chinese Communist Party is such an organization, and so are many of the enterprises required for economic modernization. Viewed against this background, Sun Yat-sen's observation had an element of validity which his Communist successors were bound to recognize.

Nonkinship bodies—such as the neighborhood *pao chia* (mutual security) organizations set up under the previous Kuomintang government, the secret societies, and the pro-Kuomintang unions—were early casualties of the party's determination to reorder society within a pervasive organizational structure of its own. Because kinship is unalterable, the married state basic, and personal feelings sometimes hidden, it could not deal similarly with these, and the problems arising from them have surfaced at every level, including that of the party's top leadership. Indeed, it is at that level that the cadres show the most obvious evidence of having been imperfectly remolded—despite the fact that virtually none of them has been spared the often traumatic experience of group criticism and compulsory self-criticism.

The party has approached the task of transferring loyalties to itself through new marriage laws, ideological indoctrination, and group pressures—all designed to lessen the authority that family members traditionally have exercised over one another. It has also taken a variety of steps—some of them intended primarily to serve other ends—which reduce the functional scope of the family and tend to unravel family ties. At the cadre and professional levels, job assignments in widely separated places have in many cases kept spouses apart for long periods. The families of the growing class of industrial workers have become less closely knit as a consequence of the entry of women into the urban work force—a development encouraged through pay scales which make outside employment of both spouses desirable if not necessary, through restrictions on the housing space assigned each family, and through the provision of enterprise mess halls and day nurseries to help free wives of household responsibilities. In addition, there has been a great increase in the availability of schooling, which takes children from the home and exposes them to a system of education in which virtually every course of study inculcates the desired values. Finally, upon leaving school, millions of youths are sent off to take up new lives as farm workers in the countryside or as pioneers in border areas.

In the countryside, the initial land reform was followed by a movement to form agricultural cooperatives in which the peasants would pool their lands, and by the consolidation of the peasants' small fields into the larger ones of the cooperatives. Collective ownership was accompanied by collective farming, which was carried on by peasants organized into teams and brigades. In 1958, there ensued an effort to carry out the communization of the agricultural sector, applying to it the techniques of large-scale organization and division of labor that are features of modern industry. Agricultural communization proved to be a disastrous failure, as did the concurrent Great Leap Forward in the industrial sector. Both were abandoned, and the government adopted a development policy of "taking agriculture as the base," under which agriculture would benefit from inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, and other elements supplied by industry "as the leading factor."

The communes were preserved in modified form as multipurpose government organizations in rural areas, with important responsibilities in the field of agriculture. However, the peasants were left to till the lands they knew, as members of work teams and brigades composed largely of neighbors with whom they were acquainted; the communal mess halls were abandoned; and peasant families were again

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allowed small private plots on which to raise produce for their own use and for sale. Thus, the relationships of the three-quarters of China's people who live in the countryside—to each other and to the land they till—have been substantially altered but not changed beyond all recognition.

The failures of the Great Leap and the initial communes, coupled with the withdrawal of Soviet aid at about the same time, forced Mao Tse-tung to recognize that the goal of making China a strong, modern country could not be attained within the span of a few years and would have to be pursued through "self-reliance." This meant that the regime could invest each year in development only that portion of the gross national product left over after the basic needs of the populace and the requirements of national defense and government administration had been met.

China's estrangement from the Soviet Union, leading Peking to invest in the development and production of its own nuclear weapons, unquestionably diverted substantial resources from productive uses, but population growth perhaps more than any other factor has limited the annual surpluses available for development. Although the Chinese Communists are followers of Marxism, with its labor theories of value and anti-Malthusian bias, they now implicitly recognize that the fecundity of their people is an obstacle to development. They are, at any rate, pursuing a multifaceted and pervasive program aimed at fertility control. This program, which runs so directly counter to the traditional Chinese emphasis on having progeny, is proving more successful in cities, where conditions of housing and employment tend to discourage large families, than in the relatively conservative countryside.

A block-card display flashes Mao's image during a mass demonstration of calisthenics in Peking Stadium in 1967.

—Nicholas Turner/Empire News via Black Star.

A contradiction developed, during the first 15 years of Communist rule, between Mao Tse-tung, the charismatic leader, and the ranking cadres who managed the country's bureaucracies. He was ever in a hurry, and he insisted on pursuing objectives through huge and disorderly campaigns conducted in the loose style of his guerrilla years. This approach ran counter to the orderly procedures and step-by-step methods congenial to all large organizations. The industrial depression and widespread hunger that followed upon the failures of the Great Leap and communes gave Mao's critics the upper hand. Thereafter, Mao came to view their efforts to thwart his will as an attempt to put him on the shelf. In his eyes, the policies of his opponents represented a revisionism which would make China "change color," and the higher-ranking leaders were threatening to become a new class of "red capitalist" exploiters. Mao's answer was to involve the populace in another great campaign, with a purge of the party's "capitalist roaders" as its main task and the solution of problems of world outlook as its basic purpose. Although the party structure was destroyed during this so-called Cultural Revolution and then reconstructed under Mao's aegis after it had waned, that revolution did not achieve its basic aim, and the new leadership has failed to prove cohesive.

The contradictions within the party are paralleled by contradictions within Mao himself, who is prone to sudden reversals of course. He puts high value on both voluntarism and discipline, and these qualities can be reconciled only through ideological conversion. As he sees it, when all have internalized the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, everyone will enjoy the freedom that he has defined as the recognition of necessity.

The life of the mind is bound to be constricted

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under any totalitarian government, but it undoubtedly tends to become more constricted when the regime in question is both afflicted by disunity and prone to sudden shifts of line, as that of China has been. Those most obviously affected by the contradictions within the leadership have been the intellectuals. Kuo Mo-jo affords the country's most eminent example of this class: at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution he felt impelled to declare that everything he had ever written deserved only to be burned. Today, five years after the Cultural Revolution, those scholars who once wrote favorably on Confucius are similarly denouncing the views that they expressed earlier. Though Mao urges his people to criticize their leaders, it is hardly surprising that there are no Chinese Solzhenitsyns.

To some extent, of course, the entire population has felt the impact of Mao's determination to exorcise all ways of thought not in keeping with his own. This determination has been evidenced, for example, by the suppression—since the Cultural Revolution—of the traditional Chinese theater, with its more than a thousand operas, to which the whole populace had been addicted. The traditional theater has been replaced by repetitive renditions of the handful of reformed operas prepared under the direction of Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing.

During the past quarter of a century, great changes have taken place in China: the building of a modern industrial sector; the reshaping of the rural society, with accompanying agricultural improvement; and the creation of nationwide systems for the collection and distribution of the produce of a vast land. Today, 800 million Chinese are better fed than the 400 millions of a quarter of a century ago, they benefit from greatly improved and extended systems of public health and medical care, and they ordinarily enjoy physical security of person. The society in which they live has a strong spirit of egalitarianism, and they can take pride in the newly-won respect in which their country is held. These are accomplishments which could undoubtedly have been achieved, possibly at less cost, under a somewhat different regime, but they could not have been achieved under one which did not provide a framework of strong and effective government.

The Pattern of Politics

By Juergen Domes

The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 clearly constituted a benchmark in Chinese history. During the last quarter of a century, China has undergone major social and economic development and has transformed her position in the world political arena. At the same time, the political system that emerged in 1949 has by no means remained static. Indeed, the changes in China's socioeconomic and international status have been accompanied by remarkable changes in her political system.

These last alterations have greatly affected the course of political events in the country—especially during the crises connected with the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the purge of Lin Piao. As a consequence, they have been described at length by many Western observers of the Chinese scene, but few efforts have thus far been made to evaluate them in a systematic way. Therefore, it seems appropriate—now that we have been scrutinizing Communist China for 25 years—to try to formulate some conclusions about elements of continuity and change in politics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and in Communist rule more generally.

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In approaching this task, we must first recognize that the concept of a stable, personal (*i.e.,* Maoist) dictatorship does not afford an accurate picture of politics in the PRC. During the last three years, students of China, like those of the Soviet Union during the early 1960's, have more and more come to appreciate the deficiencies of such a concept. As a substitute, some analysts, of whom Richard Thornton was among the earliest,[1] have suggested that Chinese politics be looked at as a process of conflict and compromise—or, as the present author labels it, an *allocative process.* That is, conflict and compromise have been the rule in the policymaking process, and an easily-arrived-at consensus the exception, throughout the 25 years that the Communists have been in power in China.

Such an approach seems to have considerable merit, for political conflict has indeed been evident in China over the years. While every ideologically-based, single-party system strives to present a monolithic front to the outside world (*e.g.,* Lenin included a provision in the statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union prohibiting the formation of factions), several signals have indicated the existence of intraparty disputes. The first of these has been terminological divergence. Whenever a conflict over policy has occurred—whether it eventually resulted in a change of policy or not—contradictions have tended to appear in the media's employment of terminology related to the area of concern. Among the specific illustrations one might cite are the differing organizations to which the term "people's communes" was applied in the late 1950's, the varied meanings attached to the need to educate "millions of revolutionary successors" in 1963-64 and again since 1973, and the changing character of the features extolled in the campaign to "emulate the example of Tachai in agriculture" in the 1970's. The dispute over development strategies in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, the dispute over rural policies that seems to have figured in a major way in the Lin Piao crisis of 1971, and the wide-ranging dispute that has dominated Chinese domestic politics since the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 all surfaced initially in the media's inconsistent use of central ideological and political terms.

A second signal of conflict has been the removal of prominent dissenters from influential positions in the state-administrative and party *apparats.* Such removals have been carried out fairly frequently. Perhaps the most dramatic instance involved Marshal P'eng Te-huai, the Minister of Defense, in 1959. He had taken positions against the Great Leap Forward and the central leadership's growing hostility toward the USSR.

The expulsion of individual dissenters from the party has constituted a third signal of conflict. Since more drastic in nature, it has occurred less often than removal from influential positions. One of the prime examples is the treatment of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954-55. These two major party figures deviated from the center's opinions with respect to development planning and possibly with respect to future relations between China and the Soviet Union as well. Their expulsions, which to some extent paralleled the expulsions of Leon Trotsky and Grigori Zinoviev from the CPSU in 1927 and 1932, respectively, provided the leaders of the central civilian party machine with increased leverage over regional administrative and military leaders.

A fourth signal of intraparty conflict has been the emergence of an open rift. The Cultural Revolution affords the only genuine illustration of this kind of signal. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tse-tung —relying, first, on more or less spontaneously organized bands of students and, later, on the military—launched an all-out attack on the civilian party apparatus, which he deemed an impediment to the realization of his revolutionary vision.

If we apply the allocative process concept to intraparty politics in China, then, we can discern qualitatively different stages in the history of Chinese political conflicts in terms of the types of groups which have been involved in these disputes and the manner in which decisions have been reached in conflictual situations. To clarify this judgment, perhaps it would be well to begin by looking at general prototypes.

At the outset, let us note that any discussion of groups involved in Chinese political conflicts must take into account both political platforms and personal status. A number of outside observers have tended to analyze disputes within the Chinese Communist Party as essentially power conflicts. At the same time, the Chinese leaders and some of their foreign admirers have tried to portray such disputes as springing from a basic clash "between two lines" —a clash in which questions of personal power have been only marginally relevant, if at all. In

[1] "The Structure of Communist Politics," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), July 1972, pp. 498-517.

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actuality, however, all major disputes within the Chinese leadership have entailed conflict over both personal power and policy. One cannot separate the issues of policy disputes from the individual persons who hold divergent views, for the rivals engage in contests for positions of power which will enable them to enact the policies and strategies they advocate.

From this perspective, one can identify two kinds of groups in the Chinese case. These are: (1) coalitions formed on the basis of individual issues; (2) coalitions with comprehensive platforms. Those in the first category have taken shape when ties and affiliations within a divided leadership have remained in flux and mostly rooted in issues; the second have emerged during periods when continuous factionalism has produced relatively coherent circles which have programs and compete for overall control of the country.

(This categorization, it should be underscored, stems from the author's assessment that functional groups *per se* are not highly useful frames of reference. There is scant evidence that such groups have, in point of fact, acted as cohesive units in intra-party conflicts. Rather, in some instances certain functional groups have joined with other functional groups to form a political coalition; in others—*e.g.*, the Cultural Revolution—individual functional groups have split as a result of decisions which transcended functional interests. Thus, it seems more worthwhile to couch the analysis in terms of coalitions than in terms of functional groups.)

Since the foregoing are prototypes, they have, of course, rarely existed in pure form. Indeed, the first type of coalition has quite often developed through a series of intermediate stages into one of the second type. The dynamics of this process were quite clear during the period preceding the Cultural Revolution and at the time when the Lin Piao crisis was building up in 1970-71. In these two cases, opinion groups in consecutive issue-based disputes became increasingly identical—that is, there was a growing similarity of views among a number of loosely-organized circles and functional groups with respect to several different areas of policy conflict. Finally, these groups, by agreement and compromise, managed to put together what approximated coherent platforms.

With regard to the way in which decisions have been arrived at in conditions of conflict, one can discern two prototypical procedures. They are (1) majority construction and (2) majority formation. Under the first procedure, Mao Tse-tung, the party leader, has from time to time fashioned coalitions of functional and opinion groups willing to follow his initiatives and constituting a majority. Good examples would be the coalitions he brought together to support the institution of the Great Leap Forward in the winter of 1957-58 and the launching of the attack on the civilian party machine in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Under the second procedure, groups have combined to form a majority in the decision-making organs without the active participation of Chairman Mao or even against his will. Prime illustrations would include the coalitions that formed to force the introduction of the policy of readjustment in 1961 after the failures of the Great Leap Forward in 1959-60 and the adoption in 1970-71 of a number of measures that undermined Lin Piao's position.

These abstractions will become more meaningful if we attempt to place them more coherently in concrete historical context. As A. Doak Barnett has pointed out in a recent study of major problems and future perspectives for the PRC,[2] there was a fairly wide-ranging consensus among the Chinese leaders about policies and strategies at the time of the founding of the PRC in 1949, but this consensus dissipated as the leadership had to face ever more important practical issues. Especially since 1957, perhaps the most critical turning point in Chinese politics to date, the dissension has grown increasingly severe.

However diverse the specific issues upon which people differed may have been, the differences appear to have revolved essentially around one fundamental issue—namely, the proper approach to economic and social development. In pushing through the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao and his supporters opted for a concept of development keynoted by mass mobilization and harsh austerity. Elements in the leadership opposed this concept from the very beginning, and when its implementation in the Great Leap brought on a major economic crisis, a majority of the party leadership coalesced and devised, more by improvisation than by clear-cut design, the alternative concept of "readjustment" in order to overcome the Great Leap's unfavorable effects on society and the political system. This latter concept found embodiment in a number of pragmatic measures aimed at political relaxation

[2] *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1974.

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and economic development based on material incentives.

Over the years, Mao and his close associates have from time to time sought to reimpose their concept and ensure its enshrinement as official policy. Their efforts have thus far spawned two major political crises—the Cultural Revolution and the conflict that ultimately culminated in Lin Piao's demise in September 1971 (Mao having by then split with Lin). In the first of these crises, the major organizational instrument they employed was a host of student groups formed outside the regular channels of the party *apparat.* These bodies encouraged mass demonstrations and open factional struggles. The undertaking failed largely because the groups of discontented youths generated factional fights which could be controlled only by invoking severe disciplinary action by the People's Liberation Army. During the second crisis, the organizational instrument was intended to be the PLA, through which Mao and Lin Piao sought to carry out a total militarization of Chinese society. This effort collapsed after it became evident that a majority of the regional military leaders would not act in accordance with the designs of Mao, Lin Piao, and Lin's supporters in the central military machine, and after Mao began to perceive Lin's attempts to build up the PLA's role in society as a challenge to himself.

We may also at the moment be witnessing a third attempt along these lines, for aspects of the current anti-Confucian campaign seem to point in this direction. If such is the case, the organizational instrument would appear to be urban worker bodies, and there are signs that the endeavor could entail some degree of mass involvement and open factional strife, just as the Cultural Revolution did. But should the present turmoil become a major effort to turn the clock back to 1958, the chances for its success look fairly dim, for urban workers in general tend to value their personal standard of living more than they do the creation of a "new society" with "new men."

The foregoing analysis, it should be observed, may lay undue stress on the element of continuity through cyclical change in Chinese politics. We gain a somewhat different impression from an examination of features of Chinese politics during the identifiable broad stages of Communist rule over the last two and a half decades.

In this connection, we ought to note first that

At the height of the Cultural Revolution in the summer of 1967 competing mobs clashed in Shanghai and even resisted efforts of the People's Liberation Army to restore order. The slogan on the overturned truck in the foreground reads: "Learn from the Chinese Liberation Army."

—London Daily Express/Pictorial Parade.

countries whose political systems draw their legitimacy from a revolutionary process have by and large undergone transitions from charismatic rule to institutionalized rule. Thus, the USSR has passed through three stages in the development of its political system. After a period of charismatic rule under Lenin, it went through a comparatively long period of transitional rule characterized mainly by Josef Stalin's personal despotism. Not until the early 1960's did it finally reach the stage of institutionalized rule.

In China, we can find parallels to each of the initial two stages. Mao dominated the Chinese political scene until his attempt to integrate critical

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intellectuals into the system failed in the "hundred flowers" campaign of 1957 and his ensuing approach to the development of Chinese society through mass mobilization ran into difficulties toward the end of 1958. Since the end of 1958, China seems to have entered a stage of transitional rule marked by Mao's increasingly obvious retreat into the role of legitimator and by a growing frequency and intensity of intraparty conflicts. In this respect, the Chinese system in the second stage might best be described as a transitional crisis system, for it lacks the elements of personal despotism. During the early part of this stage—between 1959 and late 1965—there was a breakdown in the consensus on issues within the leadership circle, although a consensus on procedures still prevailed, with controversial issues being temporarily solved in plenary meetings of the Central Committee or in "working conferences" of the leading cadres. But the consensus on procedures also broke down in September 1965 when Mao Tse-tung refused to abide by a majority decision of an enlarged meeting of the Politburo's Standing Committee not to launch a new rectification campaign against intellectual critics.[3] While this consensus on procedures was seemingly restored after the Cultural Revolution, the Lin Piao crisis of 1971 cast some doubts on the durability of that consensus. Although it is highly questionable whether Lin really attempted to carry out a coup against Mao, it is safe to conclude that Lin's political demise did not result from any regular procedure.

The characteristics of politics in China during these two phases have by no means been the same. During the period of charismatic rule, Mao, the party leader, occupied a dominant position, and the party—as a political unit, not as a bureaucratic machine—exercised undisputed control over all other pillars of the political system. Intraparty conflicts during this stage became manifest largely in terminological divergences and removal of dissenters from office, with an exceptional expulsion. The conflicts were carried on by coalitions united by issues, and decisions were taken through majority construction by the party leader.

While some continuties with the past have been evident during the stage of transitional rule, the changes have overshadowed them. This stage has been characterized by political competition between minorities and majorities within the different pillars of the political system. To some extent, such intraparty conflict has manifested itself in traditional ways, but there have been far more removals and expulsions in this stage, as well as one open rift—the Cultural Revolution. More important, the conflict has reflected both disputes over individual policy issues and disputes over alternative platforms. Thus, in contrast to the USSR's earlier transitional system, in which the combination of Stalin's personal despotism and his paranoid perception of opinion groups as already factional and hence not to be tolerated, prevented the development of factionalism, China's transitional crisis system has to date rested on an interplay between the formation of opinion groups and their transformation into factions. Decisions have been reached by both majority construction and majority formation, but since Mao, the charismatic leader, has increasingly retreated to—or been forced into—the role of a legitimater, majority formation has more and more become the norm. The fading away of the charismatic leader, however, has not resulted in a strengthening of the institutions of the political system. Rather, it has produced continuous questioning and even a diffusion of political initiative. At certain periods, to be sure, the leadership has acted decisively, but constant policy changes of a major nature have raised doubts about the long-range reliability of this appearance of decisiveness.

The fact that Communist rule in China has not yet reached the institutionalized stage distinguishes the current Chinese political system from that of the USSR, and this distinction is exceedingly significant. Institutionalized rule promotes competition between various *apparats*, but this competition is resolved by repeated compromise. In this sense, institutionalized rule conforms to Graham Allison's "bureaucratic politics model."[4] Under such a political system, intraparty conflict inevitably leads largely to terminological divergences and removals from positions of responsibility, with only an occasional expulsion from the party, for in a political framework which requires a balancing of bureaucratic elements, the minority which suffers defeat from a compromise worked out on one controversial matter may consti-

[3] *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), Nos. 7 and 9, 1967. See also Franz Michael, "Moscow and the Current Chinese Crisis," *Current History* (Philadelphia), September 1967, p. 147; and Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development," *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1967, p. 16.

[4] *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

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tute essential allies for at least some elements of the victorious majority in the resolution of another matter. Hence, that minority cannot with impunity be expelled from the party and certainly cannot be liquidated physically. Under such a system, too, functional groups and historical loyalties loom more important than opinion groups, and decision-making is normally carried out by majority construction. Disputes over issues and competing platforms also tend to disappear, with conflict concentrating on the specific institutional interests or concerns of the competing *apparats*.

A major question with respect to the future, of course, is whether China will make the transition to institutional rule as the Soviet Union has. Mao's version of the theory of permanent revolution and the events of the Cultural Revolution attest to the existence on the Chinese domestic scene of strong impediments to this kind of evolution. Nevertheless, such a development seems likely for two reasons: (1) The next generation of Chinese leaders appears destined to come mostly from the bureaucracies of the civilian party, the governmental administration, the PLA, and the official mass organizations. (2) Successive attempts since 1958 to base national development strategy on extensive mass mobilization have yielded decreasingly effective results. In short, the new generation of leaders, because of the impact of their own bureaucratic working experiences, will have a natural inclination toward institutionalization of the political system, and they will have before them concrete evidence of the inadequacies of a development strategy with mass mobilization at its heart.

It should be emphasized, however, that we are talking here about a generational succession, not the personal succession to Mao. Until the generational succession takes place, Chinese politics will in all probability continue to exhibit more flux than continuity.

Shrinking Political Life

By L. La Dany

Twenty-five years is not a long period in Chinese history. But during the past 25 years, China has been exposed to shock treatment after shock treatment (called political campaigns), and the whole Chinese way of life has undergone radical change. Fundamentally this change has consisted of adapting Chinese society to a political and economic system taken from the Soviet Union. This system has remained, despite the rift with Moscow. An almighty party apparatus now rules the country; the land has been collectivized; political control dominates the field of culture; security agencies keep dossiers on every individual; foreigners—though in periods of relaxation they are treated more politely than in Russia—are looked upon with suspicion.

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Nothing, however, would be more false than to think that China, having adopted the Russian model, has lived in peace ever since. The past 25 years in China have been a catena of stormy events, and of recurrent change.

A rereading of the Chinese press of 20, or even 10, years ago, recalls a China unbelievably remote from the China we see today. Twenty years ago, in 1954, elections had been held; the first People's Congress, China's parliament, had been convoked; a state constitution had been promulgated; laws were regulating the functions of the courts. The lynching of landlords and the radio-broadcasting of public executions were already things of the past; it seemed that a period of legality was being ushered in. The legality was Soviet legality. The laws and the Constitution itself were modeled on Soviet legislation. In retrospect, those days now seem to have been days of freedom. Even the advisability of sanctioning legal counsel was being discussed.

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In the 1950's, the People's Congress met, and the newspapers published the speeches of the delegates *in extenso*, all, as might have been expected, expressing full agreement with government policy, but also airing grievances—not very different from present practice in Taiwan. In the 1960's, reports on the People's Congresses lost vigor, and only one or two major reports were printed. A marked decline in the importance of the Congress was visible to all.

A parliament under a Communist regime has, as all know, little power and can hardly be called a legislative body. Yet, in the second half of the 1960's and first years of the 1970's, the convocation of even such a parliament met insurmountable difficulties. The last session of the People's Congress was held in December 1964-January 1965. When the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution had ended, the solemn New Year's editorial for 1971 announced the convocation of the Congress for that year.[1] That year and the following years have passed. In August 1973, Chou En-lai announced that the Congress would be held in "the immediate future."[2] No Congress was held in "the immediate future."

Chinese officials accused of leading anti-revolutionary groups are fitted with dunce caps and paraded in shame through a Peking street by Red Guards on January 26, 1967.

—Wide World.

The whole tone of political life has changed with the years. Until 1957, the classic Communist formula was observed: decisions were taken in the inner circles of the Communist Party and implemented later by the government. In those days, there were some nonparty members in both the central and the regional governments—the People's Committees as the latter were called.

After 1957, though the People's Committees continued to exist, all decisions of major importance were published in the name of the regional party committees, not of the regional governments. In Peking, the central government was still functioning, but the major posts in the Cabinet were filled by Politburo members.

The cause of this change is to be found in disappointment with the nonparty members. When they were asked in 1957 to express their views about the system and the ruling party, they—one must say—overfulfilled the target. A great number of the critics were labeled "rightists," and a new sort of labor camp, with undefined sentences, was set up. (The first type had been organized soon after the establishment of the People's Republic.)

Direct rule by the party has always been considered an anomaly. During the years before 1966, *i.e.*, before the Cultural Revolution, there were even rare articles suggesting that the party organizations should not be entangled in daily administration.

The Cultural Revolution did not solve this problem. Indeed, it boldly wiped out of existence not only the People's Committees but also the whole Communist Party apparatus—except that within the army. Only a skeleton of the supreme party organization remained.

Very recently, in this present year 1974, voices have again been heard, both in the *People's Daily* (*Jen-min Jih-pao*) and in provincial news media, demanding a more important role for the regional Revolutionary Committees which have taken the place of the People's Committees. But months have passed since these views were expressed, and major provincial conferences, dealing not only with political matters but also with agriculture and industry, are still being convoked by the provincial party committees.

[1] Joint New Year's editorial, published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, *Hung Ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (all Peking), Jan. 1, 1971.—Ed.

[2] This announcement was made by Chou in his report to the Tenth CCP Congress, Aug. 24, 1973. See *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973, p. 25.—Ed.

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However, cohesion within the Communist Party itself leaves much to be desired. Far behind are the days when, in 1956—soon after the iconoclast 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR—Peking published a document, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." [3] This document recalled that the Communist Party in China also had had its internal troubles—before Mao took over power. The tone of the document was one of self-confident belief in the unshakable unity and cohesion of the CCP.

Today the official doctrine is very different. The history of the last 25 years is being described in terms of four struggles within the party, struggles leading, first, to the purge of Kao Kang (1954); second, to the purge of the Minister of Defense, P'eng Te-huai (1959); third, to the purge of a President of the Republic, Liu Shao-ch'i; fourth, to the revolt of Mao's successor-designate, Lin Piao. The prevailing doctrine turns this succession of untoward incidents into a necessary law: the class struggle necessarily penetrates the party itself. An ominous monition is being repeated constantly—it was used at the Tenth Party Congress last year—"Follow Marxism and not revisionism; be united and do not split the ranks; walk along the great bright road and do not engage in conspiratory treachery." [4]

Such a doctrine creates a feeling of insecurity and suspicion. The Tenth Party Congress quoted another saying of Mao: "Great disorder across the land leads to great order; every seven or eight years, therefore, monsters and demons will jump up spontaneously."

China has truly had 25 turbulent years, and political rule has become ever more secretive. First the nonparty members were eliminated from the rule of the country. Then troubles started within the party itself, and these troubles have not ended. Consequently, the Tenth Party Congress was held in secret—very different from the Eighth Congress of 1956, which met with great publicity and in the presence of representatives of foreign Communist parties.

The inner-party strife has affected the whole social texture of the nation. The most grieviously exposed are those in jobs related to ideology. A list of jobs known to be "dangerous occupations" could be drawn up—teaching, writing, journalism, and the like.

Not least dangerous is the job of a Marxist theoretician. The official party history of Hu Ch'iao-mu has disappeared.[5] The works of Feng Ting, the popularizer of Marxism whose books appeared in millions of copies before the Cultural Revolution, have been condemned, and the young who read them have had to confess that they had been infected by the "poison."

Where are the supreme Marxist philosophers, the group of Marxist writers of the Yenan days? The Cultural Revolution made a grand sweep of them. The only survivor, Ch'en Po-ta, who for over 30 years had been the official interpreter of the Thoughts of Mao, has since been swallowed up as the first visible victim of the purge of Lin Piao.

Novels and theatrical pieces that had been lauded on their first appearance—none were published without official approval—were blacklisted as soon as the political wind had changed. The Chinese Literature Department of Futan University, Shanghai, produced a booklet explaining classic terms in colloquial language. This book was published in 1973. In 1974, the wind changed, and the authors had to confess their enormity: they had translated Confucian terms improperly. Confucius is of course at the center of attention today, and nothing good is being said about him. Those who years ago interpreted him as a good, "progressive" writer—an interpretation well accepted a decade ago—are now repenting their rashness.

Inner-party friction and the incessant "class struggle," which means struggle against political adversaries, has roughened the whole style of life. Old polite forms of speech are no longer in use, and the exquisite manners of the past are frowned upon. The dehumanization of human relations reaches its peak in the famous doctrine, first pronounced in 1942 in Yenan, that there is no human nature but only class nature. This doctrine was not invented by Mao; it is part of the Marxist heritage. In China it was rarely mentioned in the 1950's. Since the Cultural Revolution—which changed the whole political tone in China—this anti-humanist aspect of Mao's Thoughts has become a principal element of political doctrine. It is normal now for a man who has fallen

[3] This document was published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 5, 1956.—Ed.

[4] For the official English-language versions of the principal published documents of the Tenth CCP Congress, see *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973.—Ed.

[5] This history was published in Peking in 1951 under the title, *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang te san-shih-nien* (Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China). An official English-language version appeared in 1952.—Ed.

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from power to be accused of having professed the wrong doctrine on human nature and defended "liberty, equality, fraternity." This happened to Liu Shao-ch'i, to Ch'en Po-ta, and to Lin Piao.

The anti-humanist doctrine has become a political institution, a means of cutting off from the political body of the nation those considered politically unreliable. They are called "landlords, kulaks, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists." They are ejected from the political community and have to labor in the worst material conditions, in factories or in villages or in camps. Ever since the late 1950's, when foreign investigators began to write about forced labor in China, the Chinese press has avoided the term "forced labor," but it has had a great deal to say about the internal enemies, about the "five bad elements." Many evil things are being said nowadays about Lin Piao; one of the worst is that he intended to liberate the "five bad elements."

The same anti-humanist trend is manifest in the attacks now being made on Confucius. The attacks say that Confucius promoted education for all; that he demanded uniform justice and kindness for all. Confucius apparently knew nothing about class struggle. But no, the condemnations of Confucius also say that the system he put forward, like every political system, defended one class to oppress another—a restatement of the old Leninist tenet about the state, the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This may seem to be a somber account of the political life of China. Some may be mesmerized by certain sayings of Mao's about "serving the people" and the "line of the masses" (though the "masses" excludes, even semantically, human individuals) and by the cordial reception China has been offering of late to foreign visitors. But a close look at political life, hard facts, and official statements shows a different picture.

It is quite true that the working-out of an imposed political doctrine need not totally or permanently affect a nation's life. How much and how deeply the experience of 25 years, a short period in Chinese history, has affected the nation, only time can tell.

The Economy—Same Path, New Pace

By Audrey Donnithorne

The year 1949 was certainly a dividing line in Chinese history. However, it may be debated whether it was as sharp a dividing line as sometimes claimed, whether by supporters or opponents of the Communist government which in that year was proclaimed in Peking. This brief study will probe the question in relation to some economic policies. It will also examine another type of continuity, the extent to which certain recurrent patterns and problems, which can be traced far back in Chinese history and tradition, are still emerging.

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In the mid-1930's, the modernization of the Chinese economy was proceeding apace, and the future seemed assured. Foreign observers remarked on the way that Chinese-owned concerns were becoming prominent in spheres previously controlled by foreign interests. The British Commercial Counsellor, early in 1937, wrote:

. . . that Chinese private interests can adapt themselves to modern economic needs is shown by the growth of a number of enterprises, such as Chinese insurance companies, the flour industry, the Chinese cotton industry, the electrical industry and many others . . .; the outstanding feature . . . is the increasing, justified confidence which the Chinese themselves as well as the world at large have in the future of this country, a confidence based on the

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remarkable growth of stability achieved in recent years and the improved political, financial and economic conduct of affairs—government and private.[1]

It may in fact have been this very air of hopefulness, the consciousness of the growing strength of China, that prompted the Japanese attack in July 1937 as a preemptive strike before China became any stronger.

Most of this growth in the consumer goods manufacturing industries took place in Shanghai, Tientsin, and other coastal cities. The development of Northeast China—at that time known as Manchuria—into the country's major center of heavy industry occurred under the Japanese, who occupied that region in 1931. While their economic program was aimed primarily at making Manchuria a useful source of raw materials and an industrial base ancillary to Japan, it laid the foundation and set the direction for the great development that has taken place there since 1949. The three provinces of the Northeast (as they now are) were developed as one region and still retain that character—*e.g.*, in their unified power grid. Much more than the other "great administrative regions" that were set up in China in the wake of the Communist victory in 1949 and that have disappeared and been reconstituted and disappeared again since, the Northeast is an operative supraprovincial region, bearing the imprint of its development by the Japanese.

Thus, the Communist drive to industrialize China was a continuation of an existing trend. This trend had been interrupted over much of China by the war, and in Manchuria by the Soviet despoliation. The new Communist government during the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57) pushed forward the process of industrialization at a greater speed then before, but the difference was in the speed of development, not in its direction.

The economic nationalism evinced by the Communists was, again, nothing new, but a carrying out further and more effectively of tendencies stretching back for a century. From the 19th century onward, Chinese businesses had been growing important in lines at one time monopolized by foreigners. In many sectors, they were by 1937 showing an increasing ability to compete successfully and, had the process continued undisturbed, might in the course of time have largely replaced the foreign concerns. As it was, political events hastened the process. These events, however, were primarily the Sino-Japanese war and its aftermath rather than the Communist victory.

The disappearance of foreign economic enterprise from China was substantially completed before 1949. The Sino-Japanese war, on which was superimposed the war between Japan and the Western allies, dealt an almost fatal blow to the greater part of the Western economic stake in the country, while Western victory in 1945 led to the confiscation of Japanese assets in China, including Manchuria. Between 1945 and 1949, the Nationalist government discriminated against foreign firms in matters such as import licenses and also banned foreign shipping from China's inland waterways and coastal services. By 1949, only a few remnants were left of a century's economic operations and investment by foreigners in China. These remnants were liquidated within a few years by the new regime, which thereafter maintained stringent limitations on foreign economic activities in the country. No foreign firms have been allowed to set up offices in China, make equity investments, or even, since the last Soviet loans (which ceased in 1956 and were repaid by the end of 1965),[2] give credit to China except by way of commercial loans. Here again, the Communists have gone further than any previous Chinese government, but along trends already established.

This was also the case in respect to the role of the state in the economy. The government of China has always taken a prominent part in the country's economic life, as has occurred in other "hydraulic societies."[3] In the 19th century, the first modern industrial enterprises in Chinese hands were set up by the government, or at least under the auspices of officials. "Official supervision and merchant management" (*kuan-tu shang-pan*) was the approved formula, but much of the initiative and entrepreneurship came from the official side. The China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, which began operations in 1873, was perhaps the foremost example of this type of mixed enterprise. After many

[1] United Kingdom, Department of Overseas Trade, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in China: April 1935-March 1937*, by Sir Louis Beale, Commercial Counsellor in Shanghai, London, H.M.S.O., 1937, p. 3.

[2] Tsai Cheng, "Our Country is Now a Socialist Country Without Internal or External Debts," in *Peking Review* (Peking), May 23, 1969, p. 16.

[3] The concept of "hydraulic societies" was put forward by Karl A. Wittfogel in his *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1957.

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

An electric power works on the waterfront of Shanghai, a major port city and center of light industry.

—Scheler/Stern via Black Star.

vicissitudes and varying degrees of government control, the CMSN Co. was reorganized in 1933 as a completely state-owned enterprise.

In many other sectors of the economy, including railways, civil aviation, banking, manufacturing industry, and trade, Chinese government-owned enterprises were important long before 1949. Even in agriculture, state initiative was to be found. In 1915, government tea plantations were opened in Anhwei. However, like so many of the attempts to modernize China's economy in the 19th and early 20th century, this venture collapsed because it depended on the drive and support of one man, in this case the then Minister of Agriculture.[4] In the 1930's and especially after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, official corporations were set up for internal and foreign trade. Then, on the defeat of Japan in 1945, it was the Chinese Nationalist government which became the legal owner of the confiscated Japanese assets, including the large heavy industry, mining, and railway developments in Manchuria as well as many light industrial undertakings in Shanghai and other east-coast cities.

On the eve of the Communist victory in 1949, state-owned industry accounted for a substantial part of China's industrial output. It included all the petroleum and non-ferrous metal concerns, almost all the iron and steel undertakings, and most of the electricity-generating capacity. From this base, in the course of the next seven years, the new government went on to take over the remaining private businesses of any size and turn them into either state-owned or joint state-private enterprises.

In agriculture, the Communists made a much more radical break with the past than was the case with industry. In the early years, the elements of continuity were strong. Land reform had long been part of Kuomintang policy: "land to the tiller" was a slogan propounded by Sun Yat Sen. The early mutual-aid teams built on the foundation of traditional practices of mutual help among the peasants.

However, the formation of agricultural producer cooperatives and, even more, of communes represented much more of a new departure.[5] The landlords and rich peasant classes have, at least to appearances, been swept away. How far appearances match fact is of course a matter of conjecture. Pos-

[4] G. C. Allen and A. Donnithorne, *Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1954, p. 57.

[5] Some agricultural cooperatives had, of course, been formed prior to 1949 in areas already ruled by the Communists.

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sibly it may be hazarded that while the landlords have gone, the rich peasants are more persistent. In some instances, indeed, the new cadre may be but an old kulak in another guise.

The commune, although officially a collective unit and not a state organ, can more realistically be regarded as the lowest level of state administration in the countryside. It represents a new development in that previously the apparatus of government scarcely penetrated below the *hsien* (county). In this direction, therefore, the creation of the communes represents a significant new step.

Allusion has already been made to the dependence on individuals that characterized many of the first Chinese modern economic undertakings. The difficulty in creating and perpetuating large impersonal organizations in economic life seriously hampered the country even as late as the Nationalist era. This was partly due to the Chinese preference for what has been described as "the *conscious particularization* of economic relationships, the attempt to develop a multiplicity of ties between individuals associated by economic transactions," [6] a manner of conduct which assists the smooth running of small concerns but hampers the establishment of large undertakings that must be impersonal. In the 1930's in China, this weakness was beginning to be overcome as the growth of banks and other sizable businesses witnessed. Outside China, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, established in Singapore in 1932 through the amalgamation of three existing banks, grew into an efficient, influential body with widespread branches.

The process of attempting to reconcile the demands of large modern economic organizations on the one hand and instinctive Chinese ways of doing things on the other has certainly been carried much further since 1949, both on the mainland and also in Taiwan, in Hong Kong, and among the Overseas Chinese. It would be interesting to compare the different lines this development has taken in differing political and social circumstances. That it has run into difficulties in China can be seen from the constant complaints about bureaucracy and bureaucratic rigidity: there is an inevitable tendency to lean over too far in this direction when seeking to avoid the "conscious particularization" of economic relations which has been traditional.

In the topics so far discussed—the drives toward economic modernity, especially industrialization, and toward economic nationalism, an increase in the role of the state and of state-owned enterprises, and the growth of large impersonal economic undertakings—the emphasis has been primarily on the continuities and discontinuities in developments that have been occuring in China over the last century or so. Two topics now to be discussed—first, the fiscal relations between the provinces and the central government since 1949 and, second, the procurement of grain for the needs of the state in the same period—are but the latest installments of stories running through many centuries of China's history.

In any huge country such as China, alternations between relative centralization and relative decentralization are likely to take place. In the economic sphere, a perennial problem has been the division of revenue between the central government and the provincial authorities. The absence of a clear assignment of revenues to each level of the state apparatus was responsible for much administrative weakness before the Nationalist Revolution of 1911. The Nationalist solution was to reserve customs duties and salt and commodity taxes for the central government and to hand over the land tax (predecessor of the present agricultural tax) to the provinces, but placing it back, as we have seen, in central hands in the course of the war. However, during much of the Nationalist period, because of internal and external warfare, collection of revenue often fell into chaos.

After 1949, the Communist government initially attempted an extreme centralization of finances but soon had to accede to what became a reverse movement. In 1956, an article in the journal *Ts'ai-cheng* complained that no clear dividing line had been drawn between central and local items of expenditure, thus leading to attempts to shift responsibility for payments between administrative levels.[7] The administrative decentralization measures of 1957-58, preparatory to the Second Five-Year Plan period, took account of this criticism. Specific revenues, under three headings, were allotted to the provinces, with variations according to the wealth of the par-

[6] See introduction to W. W. Willmott, Ed., *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 5. [Willmott's italics.]

[7] See Ch'en Hsüeh, "Further Strengthen Local Responsibility for Financial Management," *Ts'ai-cheng* (Peking), No. 1, Oct. 5, 1956, p. 11.

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Rice weights being tallied on an abacus by officials of a commune near Nanking after the 1965 harvest.

—Paolo Koch/Rapho Guillumette.

ticular province concerned.[8] This may have proved administratively complicated, because in 1959 a more streamlined approach was adopted. A centrally-approved figure for a province's budgetary expenditure was to be compared with the sum the province was responsible for raising as revenue—and this was to be all the revenue from its area except for customs duties and the profits of enterprises under direct central control, both of which were to go to the central treasury. On the basis of this comparison between approved provincial revenue and expenditure, deficits would be met by subsidies from the center, while if a province was shown to be in surplus, a proportion of the surplus had to be transmitted to the center.

No regulations, as far as we know, have been published since 1959 on this subject. From the scraps of information on national financial matters, it is not possible to speak with precision or certainty about the present position. However, the system of financial transfers between the provinces and the center would seem still to be much as described.

The distinction between surplus and deficit provinces and the financial transfers arising from this distinction long predate the Communist era. In some past periods—in the early years of this century, for example—not only did the richer provinces make financial transfers to the center, but there were also direct interprovincial transfers from richer to poorer provinces. As these transfers were however made on the orders of Peking, they were not essentially different from transfers by provinces to the center.

Under the Communist government, no reference has ever come to our attention of one province making a lateral revenue transfer directly to another. Instead, the surplus provinces are supposed to make their transfers vertically to the center, which then, in turn, subsidizes the deficit provinces. If the system is ever short-circuited by lateral transfers (*e.g.*, between provinces in the same military region), no mention is made of such transactions.

The central government of China has from ancient times sought to procure regular supplies of grain for its use. The original needs to be met by such grain supplies were to feed the court and its retainers as well as the army, and to accumulate reserves under central control. The lower levels of the state, likewise, needed to secure grain for local purposes. Originally the grain had been obtained by levying the land tax in kind. This practice largely, but not entirely, lapsed in the 15th century, when land tax came to be commuted to cash. Certain payments of grain tribute, however, continued.

In 1941, spurred by the wartime inflation, the Kuomintang government revived the practice of levying land tax in kind. The Communists continued this practice, although regulations issued in 1956 permitted cash payments in certain circumstances.[9] Such a commutation to cash may be widespread. At least, a production brigade cadre told the author in 1973 that his unit had paid agricultural tax in cash since 1956, and he thought this practice was common.

The great change that has come about in relation to grain procurement is that now the responsibilities of the state, at all levels of administration, for supplying grain have greatly increased. The state has in fact a virtual monopoly of the task of supplying grain both to the towns and to non-grain-producing rural inhabitants. Hence, the proportion of the country's grain it needs to procure has risen greatly and (at a rough estimate) may now be around 25-30 percent of China's total grain output; in addi-

[8] On the subject of fiscal relations between the central government and the provinces, see A. Donnithorne, *China's Economic System*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 393-400.

[9] See *ibid.* Chap. 13, for details and sources on state procurement of grain.

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tion there are imports of grain currently amounting to more than 6 million tons a year. In order to obtain such a large proportion of the grain crop, the government supplements tax levies by compulsory sales to the state at prices set by the state. Free market sales of grain have been forbidden or strictly limited.

In seeking to determine the links which keep the vast land of China together, recourse may still be had to Chi Ch'ao-ting's concept of the "key economic area" that he employed to discuss the China of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (221-210 BC), which "was not bound together by economic ties like those in a modern state, but was held together by military and bureaucratic domination through the instrumentality of the control of the Key Economic Area." [10] While Chi contrasts this with a modern state, in China much of the ancient political characteristics survive. At the present day, Shanghai, the Northeast, and Kwangtung may be considered the key economic area. Shanghai's importance lies in its being the country's largest industrial center and the source of a considerable proportion of China's total exports and in the fact that revenue transfers from Shanghai form the biggest single contribution to the central government's coffers. The Northeast is the greatest center of heavy industry in China and contains the Taching oilfield, source of probably more than half the country's oil. Kwangtung's significance consists in its foreign exchange earnings from trade with Hong Kong and in its links with the outside world. Chou En-lai's skill has so far kept these three areas, especially Shanghai and the Northeastern provinces, closely enough linked with Peking for the central government to be able to draw on their resources. While admiring the ability with which the age-old drama of Peking and the provinces is currently being enacted, we can realize that, whatever else may change in China, this play will go on.

[10] Chi Ch'ao-ting, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, 2nd ed., Clifton, N.J., Augustus M. Kelley, 1969, pp. xii-xiii.

Continuities in Change

By Krishna P. Gupta

On the ground of conventional social science, the problem of continuity and change in China is a game that one can play from either side.

From the side of continuity, one can establish identities: between imperial absolutism and Communist state control, between Han chauvinism and Communist China's forced assimilation of minorities, between Confucian meritocracy and Maoist achievement orientation, between traditional Sinocentrism and Peking's current struggle against "barbarian" superpowers. In establishing these identities, one can easily ignore intracultural variations, evolutionary growth, the impact of the West, and the consequences of China's explicit acceptance of Marxism-Leninism.

From the side of change, one can demonstrate a series of transformations: from Confucian harmony to Marxist class struggle, from mandarin elitism to Mao's mass line, from filial piety to youthful rebellion, from clan parochialism to party loyalty. In establishing this switchover, one can conveniently assume that internal beliefs can faithfully be deduced from external protestations, and institutional reality from normative texts.

In between, one can play safe by suggesting that Mao is recreating, selectively utilizing, or manipulating components of tradition to modernize his society, and that modern China is part Confucian, part Communist. Such a suggestion can be made—in fact, it

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has been made quite often—without establishing any logical criteria for systemic transmutation, adaptation, or rejection of tradition.

In each of these frameworks, China is implicitly conceived as a congeries of beliefs and behavior patterns from which one can choose dominant or secondary value-orientations, or aspects of "Great" or "Little" traditions, to use or abuse at will. Such an *ad hoc* and segmental approach, however, seriously obscures the conceptualization of China as an integrated, *total,* evolutionary social-political system. Without establishing this totality, one cannot really deal with the problem of continuity and change.

Once this totality *is* established, a conventional sector-by-sector analysis of persistence and transformation becomes meaningless, because the problem of determining continuity and change then becomes one of defining relevant levels of generalization for each and every sector. At the highest level of abstraction, nothing would seem to have changed in China in the last three thousand years. At the lowest level of concretization, even the first and second decades of the last 25 years would appear vastly different. Between these two levels, one can chart the entire course of evolution for each historical stage.

For the present Communist phase, an adequate framework to assess continuity *and* change would require analysis at the following levels, listed in ascending order of specificity: (a) an abstraction of the Chinese system, delinked from the Confucian ideology and imperial state; (b) historically institutionalized patterns of change, with special emphasis on developments prior to the impact of the West; (c) the nature of the Western impact and the attendant change within tradition; (d) the process of accepting Marxist-Leninist categories, with attention to aspects of internalization, selective emphases, and tension areas.

Mao's modern China is to be visualized at all these levels simultaneously. At level "a" nothing has changed. At levels "b" and "c" changes have been incremental. At level "d" everything has changed. In what follows, I have chosen certain key themes to illustrate briefly the interpenetration of these levels during the last 25 years.

In this framework, level "a" is broadly ahistorical and can be described only in terms of highest-order, culturally immanent thought categories. Such a description can be meaningful only in a cross-cultural context: the Chineseness of the Chinese system can be abstracted only in comparison with non-Chinese systems. As an illustration, one can take the Western, Indian, and Chinese cultures and contrast their variable modes of perceiving and analyzing reality. In the Western culture, reality is *split* between the sacred and secular spheres, and the crucial tension has been between subservience and autonomy. In the Indian culture, reality is *hierarchized* into higher and lower forms, and the crucial tension has been between divine self-realization and human, ritual propriety. In the Chinese case, reality is *ordered* between "inner" and "outer" realms, and the crucial tension has been between personal cultivation and institutional reform. The central problem in each culture has thus been historically unique, leading to radically different evolutionary patterns.

Proceeding from the dichotomy of inner and outer realms, the Chinese have evolved an ideal of horizontal unity: between matter and principle, between essence and function, between virtue and vocation. At the apex, the ruler combines sageness with kingliness; at the intermediate level, the elites combine morality with statecraft; at the lower levels, the masses combine ideological conformity with efficient role performance. There is no ethic of individual goal attainment as such; the self becomes meaningful only in the context of virtues displayed in one's relations with others. Such an ideal fosters very distinct conceptions of political authority and social interaction. While the former becomes primarily a trust for the welfare of people, the latter gains relevance mainly in terms of reciprocal obligations. Any failure, accordingly, is invariably interpreted as a function of personal deficiency, not of structural shortcomings. Appropriate changes are supposed to occur only when men's minds are changed.

This model is faithfully duplicated in modern China. Mao combines in his person images of sublime saint and ruthless strategist; his cadres are supposed to be both red and expert, his masses both fighters against revisionism and agents of production. At each level, there is an emphasis on denying personal gain. Privileges are supposed to be exercised only in serving society. People are expected to help each other through voluntary renunciation of personal wealth and power. All deviations from this norm are attributed to defective types of mentality such as individualism, subjectivism, sectarianism, departmentalism, or "mountaintopism." Even capitalism is attacked less as a mode of production than as an evil instinct. In order to change men and

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An early 20th-century photo of the traditional examination booths in which scholars trained in Confucian virtues were tested for admission into the administrative bureaucracy of imperial China.

—Photoreporters.

institutions, there is constant exhortation to imbibe Mao's ethic of sacrifice and commitment. External material circumstances, notwithstanding China's professed Marxism-Leninism, play only a secondary role in diagnosing and resolving crisis situations. The watchword is "revolution in the superstructure."

This model, however, is essentially a theoretical ideal-type. At level "b," the model can be further articulated in terms of its actual institutionalization in China. At this level, Mao's communism involves a continuation of certain historic trends which first crystallized as early as the Western Han dynasty (202 B.C.—9 A.D.). This development was neither isomorphic with textual Confucianism, nor was it ever significantly influenced by alien ideas such as Buddhism, or by alien rulers like the Mongols and Manchus. In its totality, it revealed a complex function-and-situation-specific adaptation of Confucian moralistics, Legalist authoritarianism, and Taoist esthetics and anarchism.[1]

This adaptation produced a culturally unique pattern of systemic deviance and reformist protest. Throughout China's history, rulers, elites, and masses have tended to deviate from the idealized norm in a very specific direction, and this deviance has generated very specific types of protest. The deviance of the rulers took the form of willful distortion of the sage-king equation. To create an image of virtuous reign, they invariably tried to vilify the previous dynasty, promote their own cult, and spread an illusion of consensual rule. In this process, they went on strengthening their unilateral control over the masses—by the massive use of indoctrinational education, by organizing people into mutual-supervision and collective-responsibility groups, by systematic spying on officials, by meting out exemplary rewards and punishments, and by transferring government functions from the cabinet to the inner court. The deviance of the elites took the form of institutionalized misuse of their privileged positions. Instead of service to society, self-seeking corruption, bureaucratism, and scholasticism became their standard rules of behavior. Finally, the deviance of

[1] China's own historians have posited Confucianism and Legalism as two antithetical systems. However, in actual practice, while Confucianism generally provided the inner ideal of social harmony with its detailed rules of propriety, Legalism provided the outer framework of statecraft with its own code of rewards and punishments. In between, Taoism expressed itself either through China's artistic sensibilities or in the nonconformist visions of Chinese rebels. Together, these subsystems constituted an integrated whole; they never acted as exclusive or parallel "philosophies" (much less "religions") in the narrow Western sense.

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the masses manifested itself in a fatalistic acceptance of this tyranny. Although theoretically guarantors of the emperor's mandate to rule, they generally served their superiors with almost uncritical obedience.

Occasionally, protests against such deviance occurred from within. And here again, the pattern was quite fixed. Reformist rulers adopted a variety of measures to protect the people: measures to purify the bureaucracy by linking status and achievement, to vocationalize education by including technical subjects in the civil service examinations, to reform the economy by creating state monopolies and redistributing land. The reformist elites sought to translate their "knowledge" into "action" to rectify imperial absolutism and administrative mismanagement. The reformist masses protested against an insensitive establishment, often nurturing in this process a mystique of military exploits, peasant rebellions, and utopian reconstruction.

Both these patterns of protest and deviance have been recreated in modern China. Mao's very coming to power has all the ingredients of a protest scenario: the loss by the Kuomintang of its mandate to rule, the military exploits of a man of peasant origins, rebellion by the masses, and the victory of a just cause. Mao's actual socialist program—from the elimination of landlords and capitalists to the creation of agricultural cooperatives and communes, the linking of theory and practice in education, and the making of a responsive bureaucracy—has also been part of the main reformist trend of China's evolutionary development. Similarly, his communism has only extended the orthogenetic processes of China's systemic deviance. The accent is still on orthodoxy, although the substantive content of the orthodoxy has been completely altered. To perpetuate it, all the time-tested techniques—indoctrination through education, mutual surveillance, criticism and self-criticism, publicization of model heroes—are extensively utilized. Even what used to be extrasystemic rebellion is harnessed today to propagate intrasystemic Maoist values. Together with this, modern China's officials and masses have also reasserted their age-old deviant behavior patterns. Mao's cadres, despite all the thought-cleansing campaigns, are still frequently blamed for being arrogant, bureaucratic, and corrupt. Mao's so-called politicized masses have likewise displayed a remarkable degree of conventional fatalism in uncritically accepting the regime's fluctuating targets of love and hate.

In all these spheres, changes in China have been orthogenetically cumulative. At level "c" one can indicate areas where changes have been heterogenetically cumulative. The crucial variable at this level would be China's encounter with the West. The precise significance of this encounter does not lie in the so-called Western impact. Sociologically, the "modernizing" role of the Christian missions and treaty ports, or even of Westernizers who advocated individualism and liberalism for China, is not at all relevant. The more important changes were produced not through the impact and presumed internalization of such alien ideas but in the process of reacting to these ideas through a fixed cultural prism. This reaction was inevitable, necessary, and fatal, and Mao's China is still suffering from its consequences.

The first consequence of this reaction was a forced rearticulation of the traditional world view to accommodate the new un-Confucian universe. Confronted with hostile Western superiority, China's elites were driven to conclude that the world was made up of a weak but virtuous China and powerful but barbarian Western nations; that the only way to restore order was to make these barbarians fight one another; that this could be done only by resorting to temporary peace and friendship but actually planning for war and defense. With minor variations, this analysis was shared by leading intellectuals—such as Wei Yuan, Hsu Chi-yu, and Feng Kuei-fen[2]—of 19th-century China. Mao's current paranoid distrust of superpowers, his delusions of China's innocence and purity, his constant attempt to exacerbate Soviet-American contradictions, and his global united-front tactics are all derived from this world view.

The second consequence of China's encounter with the West was an uneasy translation of the intracultural tension between personal cultivation and institutional reform into a tension between the Chinese and the Western. This created, first, a split be-

[2] Wei Yuan (1794-1856) was the most important historian of mid-19th-century China, known for his compilation of China's first "Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries." Hsu Chi-yu (1795-1873), an eminent "specialist on the barbarian problems," was author of "A Brief Description of the Ocean Circuit." Feng Kuei-fen (1809-1874) was the famous scholar-official who pioneered in advocating "self-strengthening" for China by combining Chinese essence with Western practical science. Together, these individuals were leading representative-types of China's pre-modern intellectual response to the West.

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tween the traditionalists and eclectics. When eclecticism was absorbed by the traditionalists, this split was reformulated—most forcefully during the "Hundred Days" of 1898[3]—between the conservatives and reformers *within* Confucianism. When the conservatives themselves became reformers in the first decade of the 20th century, this conflict in turn evolved into a new split between constitutionalists and revolutionaries—a split which subsequently carried over into the contradictory orientations of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. After the Communists gained power in 1949, it assumed still another form in the intraparty struggle between the bourgeoisism of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao and Mao's proletarianism. In all these contrived reincarnations, something of the original tension survived each time, but it progressively took on the appearance of a superficial Chinese-Western dichotomy. This superficiality is most forcefully exposed in the current anti-Confucian campaign in China. Outwardly, it is a struggle between Confucian restorationists and Marxist revolutionaries; inwardly, it once again resurrects the conventional dilemma between personal cultivation and institutional reform.

The third consequence of the encounter with the West was an ultranationalistic revaluation of China's tradition to meet the Western ideological challenge on *Western* terms. This led first to a defensive reinterpretation of Confucianism, but later to its gradual abandonment when defense no longer seemed necessary. The crucial figures in this transition were the late-19th-century reformer K'ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Mao. K'ang transformed a past-oriented cyclical tradition into a future-oriented linear philosophy of progress. His utopia visualized one-world government, full equality between the sexes and generations, and complete public ownership of agriculture, industry, and commerce. This projection, however, still remained within the confines of Confucianism. With Sun, the father of the Kuomintang, these confines were broken and expanded to borrow selectively from the external socialist *and* capitalist experiences. His three principles of nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood retained the spirit of tradition but repudiated its form. Mao represented the next step in this repudiation. Although still favoring critical inheritance of China's cultural legacy, he unabashedly accepted a completely alien source for legitimizing changes within tradition. It is apparently from this alien source that China is currently deriving its concepts of linear progress, emancipation of peasants, women, and youth, and formation of cooperatives and communes. In effect, none of this is radically different from K'ang's thoroughly traditional solution. But the vocabulary has completely changed.

This brings us to level "d," where sharp discontinuities have already occurred between China's past and present. It was perhaps inevitable. Vocabulary cannot be dissociated ultimately from its contextual ethos. Once Mao and his protagonists ac-

China's new mandarins, members of the party and government cadres. Since 1966, such cadres have been subjected to periodic retraining and exposure to manual labor at "May 7 Cadre Schools" like this one in Shanghai.

—Vincent Mentzel/Nancy Palmer.

[3] The "Hundred Days" (June 11 to September 21, 1898) have become famous in China's history for the sweeping reforms introduced in this period in nearly every sphere of Chinese life: education, industry, agriculture, the army, and communications. While the earlier proponents of such reforms had often based their appeals on adapting *Western* techniques for self-strengthening, the reformers in this period for the first time sought to justify this massive modernization in the name of Confucius himself. Their conservative critics, however, lost no time in exposing this "hypocrisy."

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cepted a new vocabulary, they were inevitably led to accept a whole new frame of reference. At this point, one can analyze the role of Marxism-Leninism in China.

This role cannot be satisfactorily analyzed in terms of China's presumed creation of a brand new socialist society. Nothwithstanding Maoist propaganda, China is still not a socialist utopia. The Chinese economy still displays yawning wage differentials; there is still acute status consciousness in all spheres of social interaction; women are still looked down upon by their male comrades; villagers still believe in gods and ghosts; cases of theft, graft, nepotism, rape, and blackmarketing still persist. Yet, what denotes a distinct break from the past is China's avowed commitment to apply Marxism-Leninism in solving these problems. It is not important to find out whether this commitment signifies a disintegration or an enrichment of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In either case, there are areas where the orientation of this commitment seems decidedly anti-traditional and pro-Marxist-Leninist.

Two of these areas are particularly relevant for understanding developments in China during the last 25 years. One is Mao's acceptance of the centrality of class contradictions; the other is his belief in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both these ideas, despite their specific adaptation to the Chinese context, have violently militated against China's tradition of harmony and elitism; both have been uppermost in Mao's revolutionary vision of transforming China; both have so far persisted despite repeated setbacks in the actual process of institutionalization.

The first idea has led to the projection of antagonistic conflicts into the interpretation of China's past and present. History is rewritten to depict continuous warfare between the gentry and peasantry. Modern Chinese society is also diagnosed in terms of a life-and-death struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Any idea of class conciliation has become totally suspect, often leading to bizarre ideological rectification campaigns. In 1951, an immensely popular movie, "The Life of Wu Hsun," was fiercely criticized because it sought to glorify a nonproletarian beggar by showing that he saved all his money to educate poor children. In 1965, Wu Han's famous play, "The Dismissal of Hai Jui," was attacked because it portrayed an official who, contrary to his class nature, returned previously confiscated land to peasants. Early this year, an opera, "Three Visits to Taofeng," was widely condemned because it indirectly preached forgiveness by telling of a production brigade that apologized for having dishonestly sold a sick horse. Such examples can be easily multiplied. Often these attacks have been euphemistic—attacking abstract ideas in order to attack concrete personalities—but they still show Mao's persistent efforts to upgrade conflict as an irrevocable mechanism for all self-understanding and social change in China.

The second idea, setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat, has been pursued with similar tenacity. Mao's concept of the "proletariat" and "proletarianism" embraces two components: a *class* of workers, peasants, and soldiers; and an *ideology* of sacrifice and commitment. In the former sense, proletarians as a class have been given ascendant status—by a bias which favors them in admissions to higher education and in appointments; by economic planning which gives them opportunity for joint ownership and management; by a revolutionary art and literature which places them in the forefront of esthetic expression. In the latter sense, proletarianism as an ideology has been turned into a generic virtue which everybody should assimilate—officials and bureaucrats should "go down" to perform periodic manual labor; students should voluntarily rusticate themselves to settle in the countryside; workers should refuse material incentives; peasants should deemphasize private plots and sideline production. In none of this has China really succeeded, but it has managed to keep the ideal alive. The struggle is still going on.

It is difficult to say how this struggle will develop in the future. All the available evidence suggests that Mao's Marxism, like Buddhism once before, has failed in institutionalizing its blatantly unorthodox features. But, again like Buddhism, it has succeeded in providing a transitional focus for meeting a crisis situation. Once this crisis is over, China is likely to return to its pre-Marxist evolutionary pattern. Two events already provide an indication of this drift: the Sino-Soviet dispute and the current anti-Confucian campaign. The first has moved China away from imitating an alien Marxist model: the Chinese are no longer duplicating Soviet ideas and institutions in their society. The second has brought China nearer to the traditional categories of discourse: the Chinese are once again talking in terms reminiscent of the struggles between Confucianists and Legalists. In essence, this implies neither a denial of Marxism nor an affirmation of tradition. But it does indicate that even as China moves away from the Confucian tradition, it is moving away from Marxism as well.

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Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

By Dick Wilson

Students of Chinese literature are probably familiar with the great novel *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,* set in the 3rd century A.D., when a trilateral competition for predominance in the vast Chinese Empire set the ground rules for what nowadays would be called a tripolar political system. Interestingly enough, a leading Chinese-language newspaper in Southeast Asia, the *Nanyang Siang Pau* of Malaysia and Singapore, has been describing the current phase of three-cornered rivalry between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in the Southeast Asian region as a "new *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* era." [1] One rule of the game that remains valid, the newspaper asserts, is that whichever two of the three rivals should first begin to fight each other "would automatically weaken both their positions *vis-à-vis* the third, which would reap all the benefit from their struggle." No one power, therefore, can entertain the ambition to "unify" the region under its own aegis; all that the three can aspire to is to maintain the balance among themselves and allow Southeast Asia to be a buffer zone in which no one is predominant.

This description still applies basically to the present state of international rivalry in Southeast Asia, but the general curtailment of US commitments in Asia has tended to sharpen competition between the other two members of the triangle. Before the Sino-US détente was set in motion in 1971, the superiority of American over either Russian or Chinese power in Southeast Asia assured Moscow of US help in keeping China out. Since the Nixon-Chou communiqué of February 1972, however, the Kremlin has felt obliged—as evidenced by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin's tour of the area in early 1974—to step up its efforts to win friends and influence in Southeast Asia in order to make it as difficult as possible for the Chinese to take advantage of the lifting of US containment or to mend their fences with the Southeast Asian countries after the setbacks caused by Peking's Cultural Revolution diplomacy. Both Peking and Moscow now issue strident charge-sheets accusing each other of bullying, cheating, and sabotaging Southeast Asia. Still, their respective actions, as distinct from their harsh words, are not those of all-out antagonists each of whom seeks wholly to exclude the other from the region. Both sides evidently appreciate that there is room for both, that neither can be excluded, and—though this may be considered more controversial—that in the long run China has the better chance of establishing a superior margin of influence in the area; so the clash is one of pinpricks rather than death blows. This article will explore the current dimensions of the rivalry, the factors that favor the one or the other power in waging it, and its likely shape in the future.

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New Opportunities

At the outset, it should be noted that détente with the United States has created new and welcome openings in the region for both Moscow and Peking. Before 1970 or so, the pro-Western Southeast Asian governments were infinitely more suspicious of détente than any of their Western "allies." Yet President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines indicated recently that he was undertaking an "opening to the East" in foreign policy, although he declared

[1] See, *e.g.*, issue of Oct. 19, 1970.

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that this in no way diminished his intent to suppress Communist insurgency at home. "It is crucial to the survival of the republic that this threat be dealt with fully," he stated, but he went on to say: "Our posture abroad is necessarily different. Were it demonstrated that some of these countries were helping the dissidents' cause, there can be no question of relations. But this is not generally so." [2] The result of this policy shift has been an influx of eager Polish, Russian, and Chinese sportsmen, traders, and diplomats into the hitherto out-of-bounds Philippines.

Malaysia has moved further in the same direction. Having already lived for some time with a Soviet diplomatic presence, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak has now beaten the well-trodden path to the Forbidden City of Peking and become the first post-détente Southeast Asian prime minister to institute diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. This followed about two and a half years of negotiations with Peking based on premises worthy of a Gaullist or Kennedian diplomacy. Razak's sophisticated explanation of these premises to his Commonwealth colleagues at the end of 1971 is worth examining in some detail. Recognizing that China, having long been excluded from the mainstream of international affairs, was unwilling to accept the existing international order and seeking to upset it, he noted that China's immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia were the first to feel the impact of these policies, and that a constant barrage of radio broadcasts from China, under the name of *Suara Revolusi Malaya* or Voice of Malayan Revolution, was not only making virulent propaganda attacks on the Malaysian government but also disseminating detailed instructions to subversive elements within the country. Such Chinese interference in Malaysia's internal affairs would not be tolerated, Razak declared, and Malaysia had the right "to call on the assistance of anyone wishing to assist us." But for its part, he emphasized,

Malaysia accepts the fact that China has a right to play her part in international forums and to have an interest in the affairs of Asia. Our support for China's membership to the United Nations and, in particular, our proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia are clear manifestations of this belief. . . .

. . . we wait to see China's response, whether she for her part recognizes and respects our independence and integrity and our legitimate interests in Southeast Asia. . . .

Of course, the accumulation of years of bitterness, frustrations, and fear cannot be overcome overnight. We will require much patience. We will need to move step by step, feeling our way carefully in a matter which, so far as the countries of Southeast Asia are concerned, involves our very survival.[3]

Prime Minister Razak's statement has been quoted at some length because it destroys the myth that the Southeast Asian countries are conglomerations of inarticulate backwoodsmen incapable of determining their own interests beyond the immediate short term. Many of the region's governments are, in fact, quite sophisticated enough to be capable of playing off Moscow against Peking (and either against Washington), as the two rival Communist powers are now discovering.

Thus, there have been indications of a realization on the part of Southeast Asian leaders that a Soviet presence in the area may be a useful counterweight to a possible Chinese attempt to gain regional predominance. Again, this view has been best expressed by a Malaysian government minister, Ghazali bin Shafie, who is Razak's chief international troubleshooter. Of the four big powers active in Southeast Asia, he told a Singapore conference at the end of 1973, "perhaps the Soviet Union is the one that appears to be moving . . . with a design and a purpose." Shafie then went on to say:

It would seem that any Soviet initiative that is designed or even only such as to appear to further the Soviet cause in the Sino-Soviet dispute is not likely to gain the support of countries in the region. This factor is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has much to contribute to the development of the region.[4]

The Soviet Response

Soviet efforts to capitalize on the shift in Southeast Asian attitudes have been steady if unspectacular. A Soviet parliamentary delegation toured Malaysia in March 1974, going to Kota Bharu as well as Kuala Lumpur. Its success can be gauged by the fact that the Peking-backed Voice of Malayan Revolution violently denounced the delegation's leader for allegedly having declared that "the reac-

[2] *Bangkok Post*, Oct. 22, 1973.

[3] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Jan. 16, 1971.

[4] *Malaysian Digest* (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 31, 1973, p. 10.

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

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tionary system adopted by the Razak clique was correct" and that "Soviet revisionism and the Razak clique held identical views on issues of peace, freedom, and independence." [5] The Russians also made a big hit with Philippine President Marcos by welcoming his First Lady to Moscow after Peking had rebuffed her approaches for a similar visit to the People's Republic. Even Indonesian President Suharto's icy hostility toward the Communist powers was broken, if not entirely melted, by Firyubin's visit early this year, which marked the highest-level meeting between representatives of the two governments since the abortive Communist coup in mid-1965. Firyubin obligingly submitted to a lecture about the evils of naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and expressed Moscow's "respect" for Indonesian's claims to a 12-mile offshore territorial limit and application of the "archipelago principle" [6]—a principle also strenuously advocated by the Philippines. Predictably, however, Firyubin failed to win Suharto's backing for the Asian collective security system that the Kremlin has been pressing as a solution to the region's defense problems. "We do not want to reject the idea," Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said afterwards, "but it is still not clear to us." [7]

The only Soviet shot which has misfired dramatically was the curious attempt to build a grandiose monument in Penang to commemorate the Russian sailors drowned when the Imperial cruiser *Zhemchug* was sunk in the harbor by the Germans in 1914. In September 1973, a Soviet cargo ship unloaded 12 tons of Polish granite under the supervision of the Soviet military attaché stationed in Malaysia, Colonel Nikolai Belousov, who casually explained to the surprised citizens of Penang that the simple headstone to the sailors in the city's Western Road Cemetery would now be replaced by a tasteful replica of the *Zhemchug*. Local observers indignantly noted that the French, who had also had a ship sunk by the same German raider, had quietly flown the remains of their sailors home some years ago, and the Malaysian government proceeded to "stonewall" the Soviet diplomacy of gravestones.[8]

[5] British Broadcasting Company, *Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East* (henceforth BBC, *SWB/FE*), 4573/A2/1-2, April 10, 1974.

[6] The "archipelago principle," which has not yet gained the approval of the now recessed UN Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, would entitle archipelagic nations to measure their territorial waters from a baseline joining their islands instead of merely from each island's separate coastline.

[7] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), March 8 and 11, 1974.

[8] See *Daily Telegraph* (London), Dec. 27, 1973.

Madame Imelda Marcos, wife of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos, talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko during her March 1972 visit to Moscow.

—V. Kunov/TASS via Sovfoto.

In the economic field also, the Russians have taken advantage of the atmosphere of détente. Trade agreements were signed with Thailand in 1970 and with Indonesia in 1974. A Soviet mission to Manila in September 1973 proposed a trade pact, though without immediate result. Another Soviet delegation that visited the Philippines in March 1974 was received in audience by President Marcos and engaged in discussions concerning plans for a joint shipping line. Soviet shipping has already been actively utilizing port facilities at Singapore for many years, with approximately 600 Russian ships entering the harbor each year and a dozen or more undertaking repairs at the Keppel shipyard there.

In the sphere of aid, Malaysia appears to be a major target of Soviet attention. It is the site of the newest Soviet aid project in Southeast Asia outside of Indochina: the Tembeling hydroelectric station in Pahang state, for which surveying began last year. One of the Russian experts acting as an adviser on this project is Anatoli Erofeev, a "graduate" of the Aswan High Dam project in Egypt. At the end of 1973, another Russian was hired by the Malaysian shipping firm Syarikat Angkatan Laut (owned by ethnic Malays rather than Chinese Malaysians) to serve as its chief consultant. *Pravda* commented at the time that Malaysian-Soviet relations were "entering a new stage characterized by more extensive

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cooperation." [9] The Russians currently buy about a quarter of Malaysia's rubber output, and the Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian governments broached various joint ventures with Malaysia during 1973.

On the other side of the ledger, Moscow has as yet made no headway toward reviving its pre-1965 aid projects in Indonesia, although some Russian technicians have been readmitted to the country since 1971.[10] (Soviet and East European investments in civilian and military assistance to Indonesia prior to the 1965 attempted Communist coup aggregated about $1.5 billion—an outlay largely wasted.)

Peking's Response

Meanwhile, China has been equally active in moving to take advantage of the increased disposition of her Southeast Asian neighbors to better their relations with Peking in the wake of Sino-US détente. The significance of the 1972 Nixon-Chou communiqué was quickly grasped by Southeast Asian leaders. "China and the United States," said Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik, "will continue to have special interests in Southeast Asia. Despite their recent declaration [about noninvolvement in the region], we cannot expect them to forget these [interests] altogether, but we can hope that their activities in this area will be limited. We hope China will reduce her support for national liberation movements." [11]

Malaysia has been in the forefront of the Southeast Asian nations with which Peking has sought improved relations. Following upon Prime Minister Razak's announcement of a new posture of conciliation toward China in late 1971, the PRC joined with Malaysia in initiating a series of reciprocal visits by Chinese and Malaysian sports teams, medical experts, traders, and others which eventually culminated earlier this year in the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the two governments. The PRC also appeared to be moving in the same direction vis-à-vis the Philippines as Peking played host in early 1972 to President Marcos' brother-in-law, Governor Benjamin Romualdes, and Senator Salvador Laurel—and has belatedly (just before this article went to press) invited Madame Imelda Marcos to the Chinese capital.

Since the Nixon visit, the Chinese have likewise displayed a friendlier attitude toward Thailand, welcoming a succession of high-level Thai emissaries to Peking. These moves began with a visit by a police general and the Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, who attached themselves to a Thai table-tennis team invited to tour the PRC, and culminated in visits to Peking earlier this year by Thailand's Deputy Foreign Minister Chartichai Choonhavan and Defense Minister Marshal Dawee Chullasap. The Deputy Foreign Minister's mission—which was an official one, without any sporting cover—was reportedly for the purpose of negotiating a deal with the PRC for the supply of Chinese petroleum products to Thailand at favorable prices—a prize which Peking has also dangled before other Southeast Asian governments.[12]

Chinese trade initiatives in Southeast Asia, it should be noted, have often seemed intended to further political rather than economic objectives. China has all along been trading overtly with Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, and Indochina, and even though her trade with the other Southeast Asian countries has been subject to restrictions, these restrictions have been evaded by Hong Kong and Singapore merchants acting as middlemen. Hence, Peking's offers of official commercial relations appeared to have relatively minor economic importance and to be aimed more at paving the way for full political relations. This was readily apparent from a statement made by Chou En-lai to a visiting trade delegation from the Philippines in 1973 that "trade relations between the two countries can be immediately expanded and further developed into diplomatic relations in the near future." [13] Peking has followed up this move during the current year by sending Wang Ting-yao, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade to Manila to conduct further talks.

In seeking to expand their official trade relationships in Southeast Asia, the Chinese have apparently benefited from a reputation for fair play and for being more aboveboard than Western capitalist corporations. At the height of the euphoria among Southeast Asian Chinese over the Nixon visit to Peking, Michael Chen, Executive Secretary of the ruling Alliance Party of Malaysia and certainly no Communist, told a gathering of the Selangor Laundry Association that the Chinese, unlike the Ameri-

[9] Quoted in *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Sept. 7, 1973.
[10] *The New York Times*, March 21, 1973.
[11] *The Straits Times* (Singapore), May 20, 1972.
[12] *Asia Research Bulletin* (Singapore), Vol. 3, No. 8, Jan. 31, 1974, p. 2404.
[13] *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), May 16, 1973.

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cans or the Japanese, would not seek to acquire ownership of Malaysian enterprises or to manipulate the international rubber market. "Only China," he was reported as saying, "could help free Malaysia from economic control of other countries, because China traded on a barter basis," buying as much as she sold to another country.[14]

This suggests that the Sino-Soviet contest for friends and influence in Southeast Asia is not one in which all the advantages lie on one side or the other. There are important factors favoring each of the parties, and it is these elements which must be weighed if one is to speculate intelligently about the outcome. There are two factors in particular which appear to have worked to Moscow's advantage and which the Chinese have consequently been compelled to expend a great deal of diplomatic energy to try to minimize. These are Peking's twin associations, in Southeast Asian eyes, (1) with local national liberation movements, and (2) with the region's local populations of Chinese ethnic origin. Let us consider first how China's close identification with Southeast Asian revolutionary movements has affected the terms of Sino-Soviet competition.

Chinese Revolutionism

That Southeast Asian government leaders, particularly those with military connections, see Peking as closely linked with national liberation or insurgency movements in the area can hardly be contested. In Indonesia, President Suharto has called it a "proven" fact that China "lent its support" to the abortive 1965 leftist coup d'état—an action which constituted "interference in the [country's] internal affairs"; and Admiral Sudomo, the naval Chief-of-Staff, has also claimed to have evidence of Chinese arms being smuggled into Indonesia for rebel use.[16] Similarly, in the Philippines, President Marcos reportedly suspects China of being behind the supply of weapons to the New People's Army insurgents on the coast of northern Luzon,[17] although the absence of any great publicity about it suggests that the quantities of arms and other supplies delivered to insurgent groups probably have not been consequential. Outside the "bamboo buffer" zone of Indochina and Burma, Chinese patronage of insurgency has generally tended to emphasize the intangibles of diplomacy and propaganda rather than such concrete support as supplies of goods and cash; still, Southeast Asians see Peking as morally committed to support its co-ideologists in the area in one way or another. "While China seems to have matured as a power vis-à-vis the great powers," a Singapore diplomat observed, "it nevertheless continues to serve as a source of inspiration for revolutionary Communist forces in our region." [18]

It is equally clear that the Soviet Union has sought to make maximum capital of this widespread unease over China's sincerity in dealing with the established Southeast Asian governments. Thus, the Soviet English-language news weekly *New Times* warned that the Peking leaders, "by forcing their adventurist tactics on some detachments of the Communist and national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and trying to use them as an instrument to establish China's domination in Asian countries," are "dooming these forces to defeat." The journal explicitly cited the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia as cases in point.[19]

On the face of things, it might seem incongruous that one Communist power has succeeded in gaining an advantage in dealing with established Southeast Asian regimes by pointing to the ties of the other with local radical movements. To understand why this is true, it is necessary to probe more deeply into the specific situations that exist in the ten Southeast Asian states.

Some may find it surprising that the Chinese have greater influence than the Russians on the local Communist movements in all but four cases: the ruling North Vietnamese Communists, the Communist Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam, and the leftist camps in Laos and Cambodia, all of which prefer to steer a cautious middle course between the two rival patrons of the Communist world in Peking and Moscow. North Vietnam is the only country in Asia where an extremely strong and self-confident Communist regime has ruled—on China's very border—even longer than the Chinese Communists themselves have held power in Peking. It is quite natural that such a seasoned and unchallenged Communist government has tried as far as possible—and will continue to try—to hew to a "neutralist" stance vis-à-vis the two

[14] *The China Press* (Kuala Lumpur), Jan. 24, 1972.
[15] *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 10, 1972.
[16] *The Straits Times* (Singapore), May 20, 1972.
[17] *The Asian* (Hong Kong), July 30, 1972.
[18] Quoted in Lau Teik Soon, Ed., *New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Singapore, 1973, p. 25.
[19] No. 23, June 9, 1970, p. 15.

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centers of Communist power. And it is Hanoi which, in turn, calls the tune for the Communist revolutionaries in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, all of whom are dependent on the support of the North Vietnamese.

But while the revolutionary forces in Laos and Cambodia look primarily to Hanoi rather than to either Peking or Moscow, there are nevertheless some potentialities for Sino-Soviet rivalry in both these cases. In the case of Laos, the greater advantages in such competition would clearly seem to lie with China since the two countries directly border on each other and China has a substantial presence along the Chinese-built road leading south from the border toward Thailand. In Cambodia, developments since the ouster of Prince Sihanouk by Lon Nol in March 1970 have given rise to an extremely complex situation in which the Chinese initially gained an edge but have recently come under increasing challenge from the Russians in an intense struggle for influence. This situation merits somewhat closer examination.

When the pro-Western Lon Nol regime first seized power in Phnom Penh, it was the Chinese who responded first, by providing Prince Sihanouk, in spite of his open rejection of communism, with facilities in Peking as a head-of-state in exile. Moscow reacted more slowly and only began phasing out its diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh after Prince Sihanouk, taking issue with Castro at the nonaligned summit in Algiers in September 1973 over the Cuban leader's praise of the Soviet Union as the best friend of the nonaligned world, declared that "we fully respect the Soviet Union, but one thing we cannot understand is why Moscow maintains diplomatic relations with the clique of traitors under Lon Nol, with whom we are fighting." [20] This blunt criticism prompted the Kremlin to try to patch up its awkward position in Cambodia; nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge has continued to lean heavily toward China, as was graphically demonstrated in May 1974 when a delegation from the rebel Cambodian regime, headed by Deputy Premier Khieu Samphan, made an official tour of eleven countries under overt Chinese auspices. If this was not enough, the 1974 May Day message disseminated by the Khmer Rouge news agency AKI expressed appreciation for the active support given to the revolutionary cause in Cambodia by "the working class and other laboring people of Vietnam, Laos, China, Korea, Albania, Cuba, Romania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Mauritania and other countries, and by friendly people in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and other areas of the world, including the American working class," but conspicuously omitted any mention of support from the Soviet Union.[21]

A delegation of party and government officials from N. Vietnam arrives in Peking on June 4, 1973, for a "friendly official" visit. In the foreground, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai greets Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party; directly behind Le Duan is Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 8, 1973, p. 2.

In the meantime, however, there has been such a pronounced upsurge of Soviet interest in the Cambodian situation that official circles in Thailand have nervously begun to speculate that Moscow may be preparing to take control in Cambodia and turn the port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) into a Soviet base which could be used to blockade the Gulf of Thailand. "The Russians and the Chinese," a leading Thai commentator declared a year ago, "have already begun their struggle for influence" in Cambodia.

With the American role there minimized, Cambodia has become the testing ground of Sino-Soviet conflict for dominance over Southeast Asia, and the winner will be able to exert authority in the region.[22]

Turning to the other countries of Southeast Asia, one finds that there is only one in which Chinese

[20] As quoted in *Bangkok Post*, Sept. 8, 1973.

[21] As reported by New China News Agency (henceforth NCNA), May 1, 1974.

[22] *Bangkok Post*, Sept. 2, 1973.

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influence over the local Communist movement today faces at least a potential but genuine Soviet challenge—namely, Indonesia, where the Maoist brand of Marxist populism from the outset faced an uphill battle against the more orthodox and static Marxism preached in Moscow. The Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI, seems still to be split between a pro-Chinese and a pro-Soviet wing. The former is represented by Jusuf Adjitorop, so far as is known the sole survivor of the pre-1965 party Politburo, who now lives in Peking, ostensibly as a delegate of the PKI Central Committee. The pro-Soviet wing, or so-called Marxist-Leninist group, currently appears to be leaderless, with its cadres largely incapacitated by detention in the camps of Buru and other parts of Indonesia. Moscow, however, scored some points in 1971 by flying out supplies of food, clothing, and medicine for these cadres, placing the Indonesian authorities in the awkward position of rejecting what superficially appeared to be a humanitarian act. Regardless of the division in the party, the rigorous policy of suppression followed by the Suharto government since 1965 makes it difficult to assess the overall Communist position in Indonesia today. There are probably only a few thousand Communists operating at present, and their activities appear to be uncoordinated. Meanwhile, the competition between Peking and Moscow for their allegiance continues—but outside Indonesia rather than within.[23]

In all the remaining Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese are really unchallenged in their hold on the confidence and outlook of the actively insurgent Communists. In Burma, the "White Flag" Communists are the only viable Marxist group left on the scene, and they look exclusively to Peking for their support. The Russians, having seen their own "Red Flag" protégés disappear, have been happy to woo the established government of President Ne Win: in November 1973, Soviet party chief Brezhnev sent a message to the leaders of the ruling Burmese party wishing them "big success in achieving the most important political and socioeconomic goals put forward by its [the Burmese party's] Second Congress." [24] The Chinese, on the other hand, at a time when they have been soft-pedaling armed insurgency against established bourgeois governments in almost every other theater, have been openly supporting aggressive anti-government actions by the White Flags. One factor behind this exceptional Chinese policy may have been that Peking wished to assure itself of White Flag help in curbing the reported infiltration of Chinese Nationalist intelligence agents from Taiwan into the Thai-Burmese-Laotian border area, although adequate documentation of these reports is lacking.[25] In any case, Peking's apparent judgment that exceptionally strong support of the Burmese rebels is necessary in spite of China's equal desire to maintain as good relations as possible with the Ne Win government was underscored by the appearance at the May Day festivities in Peking this year of Ba Thein Tin, Vice-President of the Burmese CP Central Committee.

The situation in the Philippines is in many respects analogous to that in Burma. Although there formerly were elements in the Philippine Communist Party who leaned toward Moscow, the Manila government claims that these have all been apprehended, but it acknowledges that the pro-Peking groups have been more successful in remaining at large. This is simply another way of saying that it is Peking whose influence predominates over the still active Communist movement in the country.

Chinese influence likewise holds sway over the Malaysian Communist Party, which is led by and largely composed of Malaysian Chinese and has had a close relationship with Peking all along. (The party's sphere of operations, it should be noted, also includes Singapore.) After returning from his trip to Peking in June of this year, Prime Minister Razak stated that he had received "categorical assurances" from Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai, and other Chinese leaders "that they regard the remnant terrorists in our country as our internal problem that is for us to deal with as we think best." [26] China, however, has continued to provide the Malayan insurgents with facilities for broadcasting in Malay, although these broadcasts were somewhat subdued during the Razak visit. They again resumed their customary incendiary tone after his departure, and the only difference is that Chinese official radio broadcasts have not picked them up as frequently as

[23] See Arnold Brackman in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), July 17, 1971.

[24] *Soviet News* (London), Nov. 6, 1973.

[25] This situation developed during 1972-73, when Nationalist agents who had formerly carried on underground activities in China's southern coastal provinces reportedly shifted their operations to the so-called "golden triangle" in the Thai-Burmese-Laotian border region with the acquiescence of the then Thai government. Their activities evidently prompted the Chinese authorities in Yunnan Province to pursue hostile elements across the Burmese border with the help of the White Flags, causing heightened tension between Peking and Rangoon.

[26] BBC, *SWB/FE*, 4616/A3/5, June 5, 1974.

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before or quoted their denunciations of the Malaysian government with quite the same fervor.

The clandestine Communist Party in Thailand is very small and has little influence, but like the Malaysian party it is largely composed of Thais of Chinese ethnic origin and looks to Peking for ideological guidance and support.[27] It is believed to provide direction to local insurgent groups operating in remote border areas of the country. Although there were reports of Soviet efforts to infiltrate the local labor unions earlier this year, this has been denied by a leading Thai trade unionist.[28]

The overall picture that emerges from this Southeast Asian *tour d'horizon* is one that reveals the Chinese to be much more closely identified than the Russians with the radical and insurrectionary movements in the region, and it is this identification—in the minds of the local leaderships—that has afforded the Russians a major advantage in pressing their own efforts to strengthen relations with the established Southeast Asian governments. This situation obviously poses a difficult problem for Peking. As the *Bangkok Post* editorialized late last year (December 19), "with India a staunch Soviet ally, China cannot afford to have itself further encircled along its soft underbelly by any dominating Russian influence in Southeast Asia." But if the Chinese are to undercut the Russians, they must themselves develop normal relations with the region's established governments—which would involve curtailing their ties with the insurrectionary movements. To quote from a Malaysian newspaper editorial,

China wishes to neutralize the Soviet Union, which it sees as pursuing a policy of containing China reminiscent of America's Dullesian policies of the 1950's and 1960's . . . [but] it must know that subversion will drive the states of Southeast Asia into the arms of its enemies. . . .[29]

For the Chinese, however, it is not that easy simply to cut off relations with their ideological followers in Southeast Asia. For one thing, their ties with the Maoist-oriented insurrectionary groups are too long-standing and intimate to be lightly cast aside. As the London *Times* recently observed (April 1, 1974):

Unfortunately the close Chinese links with these parties were formed in the days when the Sino-Soviet dispute had each side competing for the allegiance of all other [Marxist] parties, and how can parties won over to Maoism ever be formally forsaken while the founder of their faith still rules in Peking?

The result of this dilemma is that Peking is currently attempting to perform a delicate tightrope-walking act. On the one hand, it is seeking to persuade the established Southeast Asian governments that it will not try to subvert their efforts to deal as they see fit with the insurrectionary movements and that they therefore have nothing to fear from normalizing relations with China. On the other hand, it is seeking to retain at least enough of its ties with the radical Communist movements to satisfy its own ideological conscience and to prevent them from shifting their allegiance to the Soviet side. Clearly, one reason why the Razak government of Malaysia finally established diplomatic relations with Peking —and why other non-Communist Southeast Asian governments may be leaning in the same direction —is that these governments believe that the guerrilla movements will be undercut if they see their Chinese patrons associating on cordial terms with the very regimes those movements are fighting against. Peking's thorny task is to go far enough to encourage this idea among the Southeast Asian governments, but not so far as to thoroughly alienate the radical movements that look to China for guidance. The very difficulty of this task suggests that the Russians may well continue to enjoy an advantage over their Chinese rivals in the contest for influence in Southeast Asia for some time to come.

The Overseas Chinese Liability

The second issue which the Soviet Union has successfully exploited in carrying on its competition with China has been the role and position of the Overseas Chinese in the region. In 1973, for example, Moscow published a book by Mikhail Andreev entitled *Overseas Chinese Bourgeoisie—Peking's Tool in Southeast Asia.* It elaborated the thesis that China was exploiting the region through the millions of Chinese capitalists living there.

In reaction to such maneuvering, China has reemphasized the policy that it followed during the Bandung period in the mid-1950's—namely, en-

[27] US Department of State, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (1973 Edition), Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 96.

[28] *Bangkok Post,* April 2, 1974.

[29] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), as quoted in *New Nation* (Singapore), May 23, 1972.

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couraging Overseas Chinese in the region to take up local nationality and abandon any allegiance they might have to China. Peking officials in 1972 told a Philippine journalist, Antonio Zumel of the *Manila Daily Bulletin*, that ex-Chinese "who have adopted other citizenships are expected to owe allegiance to their countries and to contribute to the well-being of their countrymen." [30] During Malaysian Prime Minister Razak's 1974 visit to Peking, Premier Chou and his colleagues spelled out their new policy on this matter in more detail. The joint communiqué of the two prime ministers on May 31 stated:

. . . the Chinese Government considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will or acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality. As for residents who retain Chinese nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by the law of the Government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there, and live in unity with them, and their proper rights and interests will be protected by the Government of China and respected by the government of Malaysia.[31]

The responses of the Southeast Asian countries to China's reassurances have varied somewhat. Razak told his enthusiastic countrymen after his return to Kuala Lumpur that the Chinese government had agreed to "far-reaching and historic commitments" with regard to the Overseas Chinese. Peking, he said, believed that their destiny was with the countries and peoples among whom they had lived for so long—that they should "integrate themselves into the countries of their residence and . . . should form an integral part of the local society and not consider themselves separate from it." [32] However, an official Indonesian radio commentary warned that "observers believe that Chinese support of Communists in Malaysia will be quietly continued, while the abolition of the dual nationality of Chinese residents will be on paper only. . . ." [33] Earlier, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik had discussed this question with Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at the Paris conference on Vietnam at the beginning of 1973, and he had told Chi that "Indonesia would need time to educate its Chinese population to be loyal to Indonesia and not have their orientation toward Peking." According to Malik, Chi "agreed with this." [34]

This question of nationality and status is obviously of compelling importance to the governments of at least three countries. Indonesia has about 275,000 Chinese who lack local citizenship and therefore owe some residual obligation to the Chinese government; the Philippines, a similar number; and Malaysia, some 220,000. Malaysia's new diplomatic relations with China will thus be closely watched for their impact on such Chinese.

As in the case of the local Communist parties, it should be underscored, there is a factor which compels Peking to proceed cautiously in dealing with the Overseas Chinese question. This is the presence of an alternative patron. If Peking were to abandon the Southeast Asian Chinese to their fate completely, it would invite the Taiwan authorities to assert a stronger influence over them by parading themselves as better protectors.

However, Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971 and its visible loss of diplomatic status throughout the world have tended to diminish the force of this argument. Indeed, Peking has not hesitated to have its missions to the region boycott the local Chinese and actually to assist the local governments in promoting *bumiputra* (non-Chinese, *i.e.*, Malay or Indonesian) interests at the expense of the local Chinese even when it comes to trade with China. The sight of Chinese visitors from Peking coming to Malaysia, speaking Malay, wearing Malay dress, dancing Malay dances, and conspicuously not calling on the local Chinese community has stirred conflicting emotions in Malaysian Chinese hearts over these past two years. Nonetheless, the ambivalent loyalties of the Overseas Chinese still constitute a definite obstacle to Peking's wooing of the Southeast Asian governments and hence an advantage for the Russians.

Soviet Vulnerabilities

As noted at the outset, the Soviet Union also suffers from some liabilities that work to China's advantage. On at least two general international issues close to the hearts of Southeast Asian governments, Peking has won esteem by lending support to the positions of these governments, while the

[30] As quoted in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), March 30, 1972.
[31] NCNA, May 31, 1974.
[32] BBC, *SWB/FE*, 4616/A3/5, June 5, 1974.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *The Japan Times*, April 27, 1973.

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

The Russian cruiser Aleksandr Suvorov *photographed 10 miles off Singapore on its way from the South China Sea to the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean on January 15, 1971.*

—UPI.

USSR has felt obliged to take stances which have cast it in the villain's role. These issues have been (1) the law of the sea and (2) freedom from superpower pressures.

With regard to the first, the central controversy has involved the extent of local territorial waters. In 1972, Malaysia and Indonesia jointly declared that the Strait of Malacca did not constitute international waters—a stand which immediately stirred the wrath of the US, the USSR, Britain, Japan, and other maritime powers. China, however, spoke up loudly on their behalf. At the now recessed Conference on the Law of the Sea in Caracas this past summer, the Chinese even sought to don the mantle of champion of the Southeast Asian states on this issue. China also emerged at the conference as upholder of the "archipelago principle"—a principle which Indonesia and the Philippines have asserted as a means of maximizing their control over their interinsular waters. (It is worth pointing out here that gratefulness for such support from Peking against the two superpowers probably has had much to do with Indonesia's recent backing of China's claims to the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.)

While the Soviet Union has belatedly tempered its insistence on preserving international waters to the greatest extent possible, it has not retreated enough to undo the damage caused by its earlier stance, and the Chinese have done their utmost to exploit the situation. Two recent articles in the Chinese party daily *Jen-min Jih-pao* setting out the "crimes" of the "social imperialists" in Southeast Asia afford good illustrations. One attacked Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, the USSR's Vice-Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and his book, *The Navy in Times of War and Peace,* for advocating an expansionist and bullying role for the Soviet Navy in Eastern waters.[35] The other, in the course of a general catalog of Soviet efforts to dominate Southeast Asia, accused "the Soviet revisionists" of sending "their 'trawlers' to run amuck in Indonesia's territorial waters" around "the Portuguese-occupied part of Timor Island" in disregard of "Indonesia's sovereignty over her territorial waters"; it went on:

What warrants particular attention is that in recent years the Soviet revisionists have loudly trumpeted "internationalization" of the Malacca Strait. Such domineering acts in utter disregard of international law and in wanton violation of other countries' sovereignty over their territorial waters have invoked strong opposition from the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments.

It is no accident that the Soviet revisionists harbor aggressive designs on the ports of Southeast Asian countries and the Malacca Strait. . . .

. . . Their smug calculation is to secure for their Vladivostok-based Pacific Fleet free passage via the Sea of Japan through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean and then to link this up with the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea Fleets in an attempt to establish hegemony in these vast waters.[36]

While this last charge has a ring of propagandistic excess, it cannot be dismissed as utter fantasy. Certainly, some Southeast Asian leaders accept the possibility that it might be true. Last year, for example, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore pub-

[35] Article by Kung Ping and Chen Hua, *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), May 9, 1974.

[36] Article by Hsiang Tung, *ibid.*, March 19, 1974.

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licly proposed in Tokyo that a joint naval task force comprising American, Japanese, Australian, and West European fleets be formed to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia.[37]

As for the issue of freedom from superpower pressures, the controversy has revolved around proposals for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. A number of Southeast Asian governments have recently demonstrated interest in such proposals. Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this interest has been the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—composed of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). This declaration proclaimed Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. It followed a Malaysian campaign to secure international neutralization of the region under big-power guarantee (a goal which, though influential during the 1970-73 period, has now been abandoned).

The attraction of neutralization for Southeast Asian governments lies in the hope that it would prevent possible superpower intervention in support of efforts by minority areas to secede and constitute themselves as independent states. Because of the infancy of Southeast Asian countries as modern nation-states and their central authorities' consequent lack of full administrative control over outer provinces or islands where different religions, languages, and racial origins prevail, secessionist movements are quite common in the region. While in the postwar years both superpowers have succumbed to the temptation of helping secessionists against governments unfriendly or cool toward themselves, the most recent and most glaring example has been the Soviet role in the Indo-Pakistani war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. To the Indonesians in particular, the Soviet performance in this case provided a warning of what might happen if Soviet arms were allowed into their own region.

Neither the Soviet Union nor China has been terribly enthusiastic about the idea of neutralizing the region, but Peking has appeared less unsympathetic than Moscow. For instance, Chinese authorities told Philippine Senator Salvador Laurel in April 1972 that China would respect Southeast Asian neutrality after all the region's military links with the US had been severed, and Thai officials received the same message in June 1973.[38] Earlier in 1973, a New Zealand government minister reported after an official visit to China that the Chinese were ready to give a "hands-off" guarantee and to accept neutralization in the long run because they did not want to see any part of Asia tied to a grouping which could be directed against them.[39] (Southeast Asian leaders, of course, recognize, as Premier Lee Kuan Yew observed in May 1973, that China "would first need to develop a blue-water fleet" to render itself an actual, "meaningful" guarantor of regional neutrality.[40])

Despite arguments by Southeast Asians such as Zain Azraai (Razak's adviser on the issue) that neutralization of the region would benefit the USSR by giving "the imprint of legitimacy to her role in the region" and effecting "the withdrawal of the United States without its being replaced by China," [41] the Russians have remained essentially hostile to the idea. To be sure, Moscow has over the years softened the language with which it refers to the notion in order to reduce Peking's ability to capitalize on the Soviet attitude. For example, *Izvestia* at the beginning maintained that the ASEAN neutralization scheme "lacked consequence," but by the time of

Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak meets with Soviet President N. V. Podgorny on October 3, 1972, during an official visit to the USSR.

—V. Mastiukov/TASS via Sovfoto.

[37] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), May 28, 1973.
[38] *Bangkok Post*, April 20, 1972; *Asia Research Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 1973, p. 1910.
[39] *Canberra Times*, April 5, 1973.
[40] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), May 28, 1973.
[41] In Lau Teik Soon, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

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Razak's visit to the USSR in the summer of 1972, it had become something for Premier Kosygin to "respect" and for *Pravda* to describe as "an idea that cannot be underestimated." [42] Yet the Russians have continued to push for the acceptance of their own proposal for an Asian collective security system, first advanced in 1969.

To Southeast Asians, this Soviet proposal carries with it distinct anti-Chinese overtones—overtones in no way removed by A. E. Nesterenko's assurance at the 1973 ECAFE conference in Tokyo that "in our view the People's Republic of China would be a full-fledged member of such a system." [43] Consequently, no Southeast Asian leaders have endorsed it. President Suharto of Indonesia, for instance, dismissed it with the remark that "we want ASEAN to strengthen regional independence and avoid having this area become a regional cockpit." [44] Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia rejected it on the ground that "to bring the big countries in Asia into such a scheme will be to bring in problems which we small nations may find difficult to resolve." [45]

No one in Southeast Asia, however, believes that the USSR will abandon its collective security scheme in favor of regional neutralization. Hence, the Chinese can gleefully point to the Soviet posture as confirmation of Moscow's selfish intentions.

The Future

Let us turn now to a brief consideration of the probable course of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia in the years immediately ahead. To begin with, we must recognize that geography and culture will inevitably be major influences on the respective abilities of the two rival Communist suitors for Southeast Asia's hand to achieve their ends. From these standpoints, China possesses distinct advantages. It is so close to Southeast Asia that it cannot be wished away; so it must be satisfactorily accommodated. And its history as a font of Asian culture means that it can elicit responses from the region which the Soviet Union (and the United States for that matter) cannot. Indeed, it benefits politically from every degree of alienation from the Western world that a Southeast Asian experiences.

To at least a limited extent, it is true, some Southeast Asians can—and in all likelihood will—deem it "safer to deal with the remote superpower" than with nearby China,[46] but doing so is a luxury available only to the offshore states, not to the states with land borders abutting on or near Chinese territory. And that is a vital distinction to be made in attempting to peer ahead into the future. Southeast Asia's landward and seaward halves probably will move on different tracks in the years ahead—one concentrating on establishing the best possible *modus vivendi* with China, the other emphasizing its freedom from all external powers equally. Professor Alejandro M. Fernandez, of the University of the Philippines, goes even a step further in his assessment of the shape of things to come; he argues that the 1972 Shanghai communiqué of President Nixon and Premier Chou in effect sealed continental Southeast Asia's fate as a sphere of Chinese influence.[47]

In the long run, therefore, the new *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* will in all likelihood have two subtheaters—a Soviet-Chinese one in Indochina, Burma, and Thailand, and a Soviet-American one in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. But the crystallization of these subtheaters may not take place for another decade. Pending this development, the entire region will remain open to a three-cornered battle, with the odds that China will emerge from such a competition better off than the Soviet Union.

Even if such a struggle continues throughout the region as a whole, however, one can perhaps expect Moscow to concentrate its effort in those portions of Southeast Asia closest to China's borders because it is there that the competition with China is strongest, and also because the Russians cannot anticipate even tacit American support in these areas. Moreover, the Kremlin seemingly has greater opportunities and cause for interest in these areas. While it burned its fingers once in Indonesia (as the result of its close identification with Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party) and can boast of only limited achievements after so many years of effort in Malaysia and the Philippines, it enjoys a long-standing presence and a good chance of making things awkward for China in Thailand and Burma, and in Indochina it will never forsake the struggle for the conscience of world communism.

[42] See *Izvestia* (Moscow), Jan. 2, 1972; *Soviet News* (London), Oct. 3, 1972; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 31, 1972.
[43] *The Japan Times*, April 14, 1973.
[44] *The New York Times*, March 18, 1973.
[45] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 6, 1972.
[46] *The Asian*, July 30, 1972. The comment referred specifically to the Philippines.
[47] In Lau Teik Soon, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

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Books

Khrushchev Remembers--But Also Forgets

By Foy D. Kohler

NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV: *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament.* Tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott. Introductions by Edward Crankshaw and Jerrold Schechter. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1974.

I CAME TO KNOW Nikita Khrushchev and his family well during nearly six of the ten years of his rule—from July 1959, when I accompanied then Vice-President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union and participated in many hours of talk between them; through Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September of that year, when my wife and I, along with the Henry Cabot Lodges and others, escorted him, his wife, and party on a two-week trip around the United States; and until he was ousted by a conspiracy of his associates on October 15, 1964, after I had been US Ambassador in Moscow for more than two years. I have either heard or read practically every word he ever said in public and talked with him personally, both officially and informally, on countless occasions.

In my own book, *Understanding the Russians*,[1] I wrote:

To me he came to be the embodiment of the almost untranslatable Russian adjective khitryi. *It is usually applied, not without a certain respect and appreciation, to the Russian peasant. According to the dictionary it means sly, cunning, artful, intricate or wily. But it really means more than this; it also means unscrupulous, smart, clever, quick-witted. Roll all these adjectives into one and you have the* khitryi *Khrushchev—a bootlicker or a bully as circumstances required, a demagogue and opportunist always.*

He also had, just to complicate his character, a colossal inferiority complex—because of his origins, because he was not an Old Bolshevik, and just because he was a Russian—and, typically, this inferiority complex was more often than not manifested in assertions of superiority. He had an inexhaustible store of Russian proverbs and folk tales and an unrivaled vocabulary of the unprintable, earthy expressions in which the Russian language is so rich.

Khrushchev had certainly read less of Marx and Lenin—though probably not of Stalin—than I, and yet he was a kind of "true believer" as Eric Hoffer uses the term. I used to think that he must say to himself every night before he went to bed that the system which had enabled him—a poor shepherd boy—to mount to the throne of the Czars had to be right.

In international affairs, Khrushchev was a dangerous man with appalling areas of prejudice and ignorance and a tendency to act recklessly and impulsively. Internally, he had done more than his share of Stalin's dirty work of cruel, ruthless oppression and bloody purges. And yet he somehow remained a common man with a common touch, and when he came to power, he was the first ruler in Russian history actively to seek popularity. One could detect in conversation with him that he was not unaware—indeed, even seemed to take satisfaction in the fact—that some of his acts would inevitably influence the evolution of Russian society toward greater humanism.

I FIND NO essential differences between this picture of the colorful and ebullient little commissar I knew and the self-portrait that emerges from his own words in the two volumes of *Khrushchev*

[1] New York, Harper & Row, 1970.

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Remembers, the first published in 1970[2] and the second, *The Last Testament,* just this summer. For, however unreliable they are as history, these fascinating and readable memoirs are extraordinarily revealing as to the character, attitudes, and general outlook of Khrushchev and his Kremlin associates.

When the first volume appeared, there was much controversy about its authenticity. Before the second volume was published, Time, Inc., had laid the doubts to rest by having its 180 hours of tape recordings verified as the real Khrushchev by voiceprint analysis. I never shared the doubts, because even the first excerpts published in *Life* magazine were recognizably Khrushchev, both in style and tone and in self-serving content. After October 15, 1964, as he himself said in the opening paragraph of the first volume, he "lived like a hermit on the outskirts of Moscow," surrounded by "those who guard me from others—and who guard others from me." In the Soviet Union, he immediately became, to use Orwell's famous term, an "unperson."

He knew this, of course. He knew that he was never even mentioned in the Soviet press or on the radio or television, and he knew that the history books were all being revised to eradicate his memory. Anyone who was acquainted with the man comprehends that he was under tremendous mental compulsion to justify himself, to find a way somehow to recapture the place in Russian history to which he considered himself entitled.

Thus, Khrushchev started to make his own version of the record on dictated tapes—a process which, as he frequently remarks, also relieved the boredom of his forced retirement. He would certainly have been encouraged in this effort by his family and especially by his son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, former editor of *Izvestiia,* who was also smarting from having been removed from that important post and given a second-level editorial job after his father-in-law's ouster. Naturally, this activity could not be hidden from the secret police, who provided the staff for Khrushchev's household and who would hardly have failed to make copies of the tapes. Awareness of this fact and related concern for the future safety and well-being of his family probably account for some of the more glaring omissions in the memoirs. There is little about the internal political struggle following Stalin's death—less, for example, about the ouster and execution of Beria than was known from Khrushchev himself while he was in power, and no real details on his victory over his rivals of the "anti-party group" in 1957. Neither is there an account of the slick conspiracy of his colleagues leading to Khrushchev's own ouster in 1964. None of his successors is directly attacked, and criticisms of their policies are ambiguous and indirect. Whenever Khrushchev seems about to let himself go in discussing living Soviet personalities, there are mysterious gaps in the tapes which make the reader wonder if those which reached the West were not in fact screened in advance by police or even political authorities. While military policies are discussed in broad terms, no secrets are revealed. There are no figures on defense costs, no accounts of Politburo debates, no identifications of key personnel in the Soviet military-industrial complex.

The memoirs are also replete with historical and chronological errors (most of which are ably set straight in footnotes by editor-translator Strobe Talbott). Some of these, of course, simply reflect the vagaries of the mind of an old man trying to set down his recollections without access to official archives or even to his personal records. Others are clearly deliberate, to serve Khrushchev's self-justifying purposes. As Edward Crankshaw observes in his introduction:

[2] Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1970.

Reviewers in This Issue

FOY D. KOHLER—Career Ambassador of the United States, who served as Ambassador to the USSR, 1963-67, and as Deputy Undersecretary of State, 1967-68; currently Professor at the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami; author of books and articles on US-Soviet relations and co-author of a forthcoming study on Soviet global strategy and the Middle East.

NORTON S. GINSBERG—Dean of the Academic Program and Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, Calif.); author of *Atlas of Economic Development,* 1961, and numerous works on the human geography of Asia.

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL—Assistant Swarthmore College (Swarthmore, Pa.); author of *Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China,* 1949-1974, forthcoming in spring 1975.

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In the days of his supremacy, his speech was filled with evasions, distortions, deliberate omissions, contradictions, downright lies. How could he be expected to change in old age?

The first volume of *Khrushchev Remembers* dealt largely with Khrushchev's early years and his life with Stalin, adding many pithy anecdotes but not really going far beyond his famous "secret speech" of 1956 in substance. The relatively shorter section on "The World Outside" in that volume featured his defense of his reconciliation with Tito, of his suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and of his surreptitious placement in and then withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.

The second volume, subtitled *The Last Testament*, is also a mixed bag—though the editors have done an excellent job of giving logical structure to what must have been an incoherent, confused mass of raw material.

Of the book's 500 pages, 150 are devoted to the domestic scene during Khrushchev's reign. His pungent commentary darts from subject to subject, touching—*inter alia*—on his relations with scientists (he distrusted Piotr Kapitsa for refusing military work but regretted having refused to let him travel abroad, partly because "Stalin was still belching inside me"); the regime view of writers and artists ("We were scared, really scared. We were afraid the thaw might unleash a flood"); housing ("It was painful for me to remember that as a worker under capitalism I'd had much better living conditions"); agriculture ("The Virgin Lands campaign showed us how mighty our Party could be if it only had the trust of the people").

The next 150 pages, devoted to relations with other Communist states, are characterized by blandly arrogant acceptance of Moscow's natural right to control the East European states and a viciously critical appraisal of Mao, reflecting the Russians' ingrained distrust of and antipathy toward their "yellow-beak" neighbors.

THE FINAL 250 pages deal with relations with the outer world, occasionally duplicating but mainly supplementing and elaborating on the material in the first volume. An almost paranoiac suspicion of the United States runs throughout. Thus, when Stalin let Beria goad him into making territorial demands on Turkey, he succeeded only in "frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans." The "so-called 'scientific expedition' . . . in search of Noah's Ark" which the US organized "at about that time . . . didn't fool anyone. . . . It was a border action directed against Soviet Armenia and our oil fields in Azerbaidzhan." Next door, "the Shah repeatedly denied there were any American bases in Iran, but we didn't believe him." Still farther east, "it was clear the Americans were penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious intent of setting up a military base there." Sukarno's troubles in West Irian arose "probably at the instigation of Dutch and American agents." Khrushchev was even worried that an American submarine might sink his ship en route to the UN meeting in New York in 1960. And so on—sort of the obverse of the American Communist-under-every-bed syndrome.

In Khrushchev's version, the cold war started with Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 6, 1946—not with Stalin's famous "back to orthodoxy" speech the previous month (February 9, 1946), nor with the USSR's attempt to hang on in Iran, or its demands on Turkey, or its occupation of Eastern Europe, or its takeover of Czechoslovakia. The United States had grown rich and fat in World War II and wanted to keep the Soviet Union impoverished. UNRRA provided only food, not the machinery the USSR needed to rebuild its industries. In all this, the "arsonist and militarist" Churchill was in league with Truman, "an aggressive man and a fool," aided by "that political half-wit Mr. Acheson." When Adenauer came to Moscow in 1955, his "initial bargaining terms were wholly unacceptable—to create a single capitalist German state allied with the West would have meant for us to retreat to the borders of Poland. . . . Once you start retreating, it's difficult to stop." However, the man usually attacked as the greatest of the Western cold warriors comes out very well. "Dulles was a worthy and interesting adversary," Khrushchev says, "who forced us either to lay down our arms or marshall some good reasons to continue the struggle. It always kept us on our toes to match wits with him [and] he had the common sense never to overstep that 'brink' he was always talking about." Even Nixon, though always considered "hostile to the Soviet Union, . . . showed genuine human courtesy when he tried to see me after my retirement."

Khrushchev professes puzzlement at receiving an invitation "out of the blue" to visit the United States in 1959. This claim comes as the only real surprise in the book to those of us who counseled President Eisenhower to issue the invitation, for our pur-

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pose of defusing Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin seemed so transparent that we were almost ashamed of the maneuver. The Big Four foreign ministers had been meeting for several months in Geneva, getting nowhere and about to break up in a complete impasse. Clearly, something new had to be done to get Khrushchev off the hook of his public commitment to move against the Western position in Berlin. In fact, the exercise produced a short breathing spell, when Khrushchev agreed at Camp David (the US presidential retreat in Maryland) to suspend his deadline. Strangely enough, Khrushchev does not even mention Berlin once in the long chapter covering his visit to the United States and his talks with President Eisenhower.

Political shortcomings aside, Khrushchev's account of his feelings about and reactions to the trip to America are engrossing and revealing reading. His admission that he was "curious to have a look"; his anxiety to be received "with maximum honors"; his initial suspicion that Camp David might be some sort of quarantine "leper colony"; his concerns about his own adequacy to face this "important test"; his discovery that capitalists looked like ordinary people without "the pigs' snouts our artists always gave them"; his obvious awe in the presence of President Eisenhower—these and a hundred other impressions are recounted with engaging earthiness.

Khrushchev adds little to the public record of the U-2 incident, except his admission that "these flights had been going on for years," thus in effect confirming that the elaborate cat-and-mouse game he mounted after the American craft was shot down on May 1, 1960, was a deliberate ploy designed for his own purposes. His main purpose comes out in his account of the abortive Paris summit meeting only two weeks later. Having recklessly renewed his threats to act unilaterally on Berlin, he was again in a dangerous situation "without much hope that the [Paris] negotiations would produce a meaningful agreement." By his own account, he decided only on the flight to Paris that the answer to his problem was to break up the summit.

I saw that the only way out was to present the United States with an ultimatum: the Americans would have to apologize officially for sending their spy plane into the USSR, and the President of the United States would have to retract what he said about America's "right" to conduct reconnaissance over our territory. . . . We knew they [the Americans] couldn't swallow the bitter pill we were trying to force down their throats . . . this meant that the four-power negotiations were over before they began.

Indeed, promptly after the Paris spectacle, he again publicly postponed any action on Berlin—this time until after the upcoming US elections.

Although he has some kind words for President Kennedy—here, as recurrently, his somewhat resentful respect for capitalist "millionaires" comes out—Khrushchev makes no bones about the hard line he took with the young President at Vienna: "The difference in our class positions had prevented us from coming to an agreement. . . . I felt bad about his disappointment."

Khrushchev is equally frank about the immediate sequel to the Vienna meeting: "We decided the time had come to lance the blister of West Berlin." He becomes vague, however, about the consequences of the operation. As American military preparations and personnel moves posed "a counterthreat of their own," Khrushchev came up with the idea of the Berlin Wall; he calls it "border control" and takes full credit personally. He talks of the ensuing military standoff in Berlin, as a result of which, he says, "the West had been forced to recognize the establishment of border control and the separation of capitalist West Berlin from socialist East Berlin." "We didn't quite achieve the same sort of moral victory that a peace treaty would have represented," Khrushchev admits, "but we probably received more material gains without a peace treaty [which would have] meant concessions on our part." The remaining doubt, Khrushchev says, was "about the ability of the Germans to control their own borders . . . to shoot a fellow German." The Kremlin was soon relieved to find that the "border troops of the GDR were well grounded in the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. They understood their class obligations as well as their military duty."

Khrushchev indicates that the Cuban missile crisis was a subject much on his mind by dealing with it *in extenso* in both volumes of the memoirs; and indeed, his handling of the matter was probably one of the major reasons for his ouster. Throughout, he vehemently combats the Western thesis (and my own) that he sought surreptitiously to place MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba to redress the Soviet ICBM gap disclosed during the Berlin confrontation, insisting that these weapons were solely intended "to maintain the inde-

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pendence" of Cuba. "I'm not saying we had any documentary proof that the Americans were preparing a second invasion," he says in *The Last Testament,* but then he hastens to add: "We didn't need documentary proof. We knew the class affiliation, the class blindness of the United States, and that was enough to make us expect the worst." Khrushchev does reveal, however, that he met strong resistance from Castro when he broached the idea. "When Castro and I talked about the problem," he says, "we argued and argued. Our arguments were very heated. But, in the end, Fidel agreed with me." He goes on to say that Castro later reaffirmed that agreement and justified the Soviet action. Naturally, he concludes that forcing the Americans to pledge not to invade Cuba was one of the great "victories we won on the diplomatic front."

I SHOULD LIKE to see these memoirs read by all thinking Americans, perhaps particularly by those who are specialists in Soviet affairs but have not had the actual experience of living in the Soviet Union and negotiating with Russian officials.

For cumulatively Khrushchev's revelations of his own beliefs and feelings, his prejudices, hates, fears, and hopes provide a needed antidote to the persistent American tendency to ascribe to Soviet leaders attitudes, values, and interests closely parallel to our own and to project into Soviet affairs a mirror-image of ourselves and our own concepts. Khrushchev's ruminations certainly make it clear that the considerations determining Soviet policies and actions are not the product of conditions and practices similar to our own but are the product of an environment, a view of the world, and a decision-making process entirely different from ours

In any event, I think the reader of *Khrushchev Remembers* must in turn remember that these self-serving, self-justifying recollections of a garrulous old man who felt very sorry for himself are not objective history. Nearly a century and a half ago, the great French observer and writer, the Marquis de Custine, quoted an eminent Russian as saying:

God makes only the future, while the Czar remakes the past! . . . Russian despotism not only counts ideas and sentiments for nothing; it wages war on fact and triumphs in the battle. . . .

I would say, then, that what we have in *Khrushchev Remembers* is another fascinating chapter in the long annals of Russian history —Russian history, Russian style.

Counting China's People

By Norton S. Ginsburg

LEO A. ORLEANS: *Every Fifth Child: The Population of China.* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972.
H. YUAN TIEN: *China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949-69.* Columbus, The Ohio State University Press, 1973.

THESE TWO BOOKS should be welcomed by all students of China as well as those interested in the course of China's development, even though they seem to raise more questions than they answer. Before we attempt to deal with some of these questions, however, perhaps it would be well to describe the books briefly, review their contents, make some comparisons between them, and evaluate them for the nonspecialist reader.

The Orleans book contains an immense amount of information. After finishing it, the reader can be quite confident that he knows as much about the population of China as anyone but a specialist in the subject would want to know. Of its six chapters, the first deals with the historical record of population fluctuation and growth, describing in some detail the characteristics of the 1953 census-registration and assessing its utility and value. The second reviews certain key characteristics of China's population and provides information about its apparent evolution since 1953 and its likely

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development in the future. A third devotes special attention to the urban population, upon which the long-term future of the country may most heavily depend. The fourth analyzes the distribution of that population and the recent patterns of internal migration. The fifth discusses, at somewhat excessive length, the roughly six percent of the national population that is not Han Chinese. By far the most interesting chapter, at least to the general reader, is the sixth and final one, in which the author ruminates about what the existing data mean and how the demographic variables seem related to other aspects of the Chinese socioeconomic system. A number of tables help to array the available information in concise form, and several maps (the sources for which are by and large not identified) are useful not only in describing certain population patterns but also in relating them to other elements in China's complex social geography.

Orleans is frank and precise about the quality of the existing data and therefore about the constraints involved in generalizing from them. He acknowledges that the 1953 census-registration is of limited value, but he argues quite properly that it is simply the best source of information there is. He recognizes, too, the enormous variation among estimates of the present population. For 1975, for example, he himself projects a population of 818 million; however, he notes that the United Nations has forecast a population of 826 million, whereas the United States Bureau of the Census predicts a figure of 962 million. He realizes the policy implications of this difference of nearly 145 million between the lowest and the highest estimates; more important, he submits that the information available to foreigners probably is of the same general order of reliability as that available to the Chinese themselves. Indeed, he is sympathetic to the difficulties inherent not only in counting noses, but even more in dealing with highly complex demographic variables in a country so huge and still so backward.

The Tien book contains much less specific information than the Orleans volume, but it was not intended to describe what is known about the population of China. Its purpose was to cast light on the policies, and the variations in them over time, that have either directly or indirectly affected China's population under communism. An initial chapter discusses what is involved in a "population policy." In it, the author clearly accepts Alva Myrdal's trenchant observation that "a population policy can be nothing less than the social policy at large." [1] Later chapters deal with trends related to rural and urban populations, with the urban population in its own right, with migration and pioneer settlement, with the perception and control of population numbers (two separate chapters), and with comparative social transformation in the broad and changing population patterns. Heavy emphasis is placed on the Chinese press, and the text is larded with extensive quotations (too many, one might argue) from Chinese newspapers, as translated, for example, in the *Survey of the China Mainland Press* put out by the US Consulate-General in Hongkong. Since more of this kind of material is available for the years prior to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in mid-1966 than for later years—indeed, the great bulk of it dates from before the Great Leap Forward in 1958—most of the quotations stem from the earlier rather than the more recent periods of Communist rule. The conclusion is inescapable that more is known about China's population in the 1950's than is known about the population in the 1960's. (In fact, this conclusion applies to a large extent to all areas of knowledge about China since 1949.) The "conceptual map" of the present is shot with major blanks which continue to plague understanding and analysis

Of the two volumes, the one by Orleans is by far the more useful. The book by Tien is less specifically focused, although it nonetheless remains a unique assessment of the Chinese leadership's policies with respect to population, such as these policies have been. In content, the two volumes overlap. Both authors agree that China is a society undergoing major transformation and that the demographic characteristics of the country will depend on the nature of this transformation. Moreover, both imply—though they are not as explicit in this case—that the type and degree of social transformation will vary, perhaps substantially, as the demographic complex becomes less and less a "black box."

HAVING EXPLORED the nature of the two books under review, let us now turn to a consideration of some of the issues they pose. Prior to the Communist consolidation of power in 1950, China had known no extended period of internal peace for more than 40 years, and both the land and the people had been mismanaged for generations

[1] *Nation and Family*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1968, p. 2.

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before that. Environmental sanitation in the modern sense was virtually unknown outside the few larger cities under strong foreign influence and/or management. The country was highly fragmented because of a host of factors: several foreign powers had administered extraterritorial enclaves at some places in China before World War II; the railway network was skeletal and disconnected; the system of internal waterways had been disrupted by neglect and maladministration; coastal shipping had deteriorated over a period of at least a century; and there was no effective central administrative authority to make and implement national policy, except perhaps in Manchuria. Death rates and birth rates were as high as anywhere in the world, and population numbers were kept under control by the apocalyptic "horsemen" who periodically ravaged the hinterland and cast their pall even over the great cities.

It would be reasonable to assume that *any* central government able to enforce its control over most of the country would—even apart from ideology—be able to assuage many of these grievances and their consequences. And this, indeed, is what has been happening in China for a quarter of a century. Railroads have been reconstructed and extended; environmental sanitation has been improved; water conservancy has been pursued; inland waterways have been reconstituted; administration at regional and local levels, as well as at the national level, has been stabilized. It is a tribute to the Chinese people, and probably also to their new leaders, that so many improvements of this sort took place within the short span of just a few years. The immediate consequences were a falling-off of death rates, rapid increases in general population numbers, even more rapid growth of the urban population, and substantial increases in both agricultural and industrial production.

All the foregoing took place pretty much on the old territorial base, on a resource endowment reasonably well defined, and on a settlement pattern inherited from earlier times. Another regime might well have simply "gone along" with these more or less "natural" trends in development, but the Peking regime is *sui generis*. It has sought not merely to develop China and to provide a modicum of security and well-being for its vast population but, much more, to transform it—and to transform it according to the perception of "what ought to be" suggested by its dominant ideology.

For a time, Russian influence on planning decisions was strong, especially in the years immediately after the period of rehabilitation in 1949-52. Industry was to be the leading sector during the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and that meant that the prevailing urban-industrial pattern was to be retained and strengthened, as indeed it was. However, the Soviet model also suggested the need to develop new industries near the sites of freshly discovered major resources if these happened to lie outside the already heavily populated and structured ecumene. Thus, the steel industrial complex at Pao-'ou, for example, came into being. Similarly, emphasis was placed on large public works, the creation of which was directed from the center. Agriculture was not neglected—far from it—as land reform was followed by the several stages of collectivization that culminated in the communes, but it was assumed that agriculture would more or less take care of itself as general conditions were stabilized and improved.

The Great Leap Forward of 1958 signaled a major shift away from the Soviet model, although in concrete terms it was hardly successful. The new policy that it represented was one in which agriculture became first a partner of the industrialization effort and later the basis for a new development strategy. That strategy was, in part, a consequence of factors not under the control of the ruling elite. The sudden withdrawal of Soviet aid in July 1960 necessitated a shift from certain kinds of large-scale industrial projects, as well as from huge public works which drew heavily on scarce national resources, particularly skilled manpower.

As the Soviet Union was transformed from a "big brother in socialism" to a "rival in socialism" and even an enemy, the colonization and development of China's outlying territories, previously comparatively neglected, also assumed greater importance. At the same time, the necessity for the decentralization of many agriculture-related economic functions became an opportunity for furthering social transformation, for developing a Chinese New Man—literate, motivated, capable of making decisions in concert with his colleagues, and self-reliant though not independent—who would provide a vast nationwide reservoir of semi-skilled labor. In the field of water conservancy, for example, the process of decentralization brought a shift of emphasis from the national project to the local, and environmental sanitation problems were to be at-

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tacked where they mattered most—that is, where most of the people lived, in the countryside.

At first, the communes were conceived as vast agro-industrial complexes. In due course, however, it became clear that application of that concept diverted rural manpower away from what it could do best—that is, produce more food for the growing population and more producers' goods for agricultural enterprise. It became apparent, too, that rural industries could only do so much and that a modern, predominantly urban system of national industrial production had to be developed along with the more localized, land-based system. Hence, there was a partial return to what has been described in other contexts as a "dual economy" in which the rural-based and the urban-based sectors were conceived of as equal and complementary. Thus the somewhat elliptical slogan: "Agriculture as the foundation; industry as the leading sector!"

As these shifts in percepts and policies took place, various demographic consequences followed. The growth of cities, already hampered by the depression that followed the withdrawal of the Russians and the food shortages associated with the Great Leap Forward, was deliberately slowed. In fact, large numbers of urban-dwellers, chiefly younger people but including some recent migrants to the cities, were moved to the rural areas. No one knows just how many persons were involved in this internal migration, but it must have been a large number, even if smaller than the regime has claimed. At the same time, an improved registration system made it increasingly difficult for peasants to move to the cities or to become "urbanized" once they arrived there. Many industries were established in smaller towns away from the larger cities—often at costs which, in strictly economic terms, would have been unacceptable elsewhere. But in spite of these measures, the "urban" proportion of the population probably increased from 13 percent in 1953 to perhaps 17 percent in 1970. Much of that growth took place in cities near the agricultural frontiers, as in the Northeast and in Sinkiang, but the data are unclear as to how significant this actually was in comparison with the growth of the larger, well-established urban centers, which were likewise growing rapidly.

If one takes India, for example, as a standard, the upsurge in urban population has seemingly been much better controlled in China, but it is an open question whether, in the longer run, the Chinese policy will prove effective or not. Such examples as one can discover elsewhere suggest that modernization (however defined) leads to ever more rapid urban growth, and the evidences of such a tendency in China are already seen in the expansion of the populations of such great cities as Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Canton. Rapid urban growth also tends to be associated with even more rapid declines in the birth rate. In China, the birth rate remains high but has been declining—at commendable rates—to what Orleans estimates to have been about 32 per thousand as of 1970. At the same time, death rates have continued to fall, apparently even more precipitously, to an estimated 17 per thousand in 1970. But then, of course, nobody really knows.

CORRECTIONS

Following are corrections of errors that have appeared in the last two issues of *Problems of Communism:*

1. In Charles Gati's article, "The Kádár Mystique" (May-June), the reference on p. 32, col. 1, line 9, to the total membership of the Hungarian party Politburo should read 12, not 13. In the table on the same page, the first name of Gáspár should be Sándor, not Zoltán.

2. In John C. Campbell's article, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans" (July-August), footnotes 5 and 6, respectively on pages 6 and 7, are transposed.

3. In Trond Gilberg's article, "Ceausescu's Romania" (July-August), p. 36, col. 2, lines 17-21, Miron Constantinescu, not Ion Gheorghe Maurer, should have been identified as deceased. The reference to Maurer on p. 38, col. 1, line 2 from bottom, should read "prior to his retirement in March 1974," not "prior to his death in July 1974."

4. In Nicholas C. Pano's article, "The Albanian Cultural Revolution" (July-August), the credits for photos on pages 53 and 56 are switched. The photo on page 53 is from Eastfoto and that on page 56 from *Shqipëria Socialiste Marshon* (Socialist Albania on the March), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1969, p. 27.

5. In Hansjakob Stehle's book review, "Two Polish Leaders" (July-August), p. 65, lines 13-17, the reference to the death of Wladislaw Gomulka is believed to be inaccurate.

The Editors accept responsibility for and regret these errors.

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TO THE EXTENT that there has been a "population policy" in China, its broad outlines have changed as other developmental policies have taken shape and have themselves been modified. During the first few years of the Communist regime, people were seen only as a "good." Every mouth to feed was another pair of hands to produce; and more hands were clearly needed even in the rural areas—not only at planting and harvest times but also during the off-season, when mountains were being moved and rivers diverted for productive purposes. Then, spasmodically but unmistakably, a policy of population control to achieve lower birth rates became an important factor—one which Orleans regards as fundamental and Tien only somewhat less so. Contraceptive devices have become widely available during the last decade and especially during the last few years, as the quality of rural medical services has improved. A trend toward late marriages in combination with a puritanical dedication to work has also left its mark.

Thus, China has clearly passed the point where the rate of population increase has begun to decline. But then, according to Donald Bogue,[2] this probably is true of India, too, despite the vastly different conditions in the two countries. Indeed, as one projects population trends for the whole world into the future, it appears probable that the proportions of the world's population accounted for by China and even India will continue to decline, while the proportions of Spanish- and Arabic-speaking peoples will increase.

If, as some claim, a new type of "demographic revolution" is in the making in China—one which, unlike that which has taken place in the West, will not depend upon extremely rapid urbanization—the evidence is far from clear as to how it will occur, or indeed whether it will occur at all.

It is puzzling to persons other than demographers why there are so many uncertainties about China's population and why a census, properly conceived, cannot be taken there. Orleans painstakingly examines these questions in his study, but the reasons he cites could apply just as well to India, which has nevertheless been able to conduct reasonably satisfactory censuses since independence, even though it is often thought of as a model of what a developing country should *not* be. The cause cannot be lack of the requisite machinery since no one questions the administrative regimentation that exists in the People's Republic, despite the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution. Can it be merely that the Chinese leadership simply does not care very much? Tien suggests otherwise, but the mystery remains.

Surely, an effective long-range agricultural policy must depend on adequate demographic information. Thus far, Chinese agriculture seems to have been able to provide the Chinese people with food and fibers at levels which have been at least a little higher than those required for bare subsistence. Of course, China, in its capacity as the only large and poor country in the middle latitudes (as contrasted with the tropics) has profited from the advances in modern scientific agriculture associated with Japan's several "green revolutions" at home and in Taiwan. Moreover, the ubiquitous small-scale mechanization that Mao insists is essential to the further development of agriculture—involving the utilization of pumps, threshers, compost and fodder grinders, etc.—is not only labor-saving but also more productive than tractors or aerial sowing, for example. Still, how long can this state of affairs go on?

Slowly, the curve of Chinese population growth appears to be assuming the S-shape to which all poor countries aspire.[3] The astonishing question for which there appear to be no answers are: when, why, and how? Surely, this is the Chinese puzzle of all Chinese puzzles, and Messrs. Orleans and Tien can help us only a little in trying to solve it.

[2] As stated in an unpublished paper entitled "Family Planning in India: Present Status and Problems," prepared for the Indian Centenary Seminar, Family Planning in India, October 23-29, 1972, p. 4.

[3] Such a curve reflects a period of slow growth, then a period of extremely rapid growth, and finally a period in which the growth rate tapers off.

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Social Stratification: A Cross-Cultural Analysis

By Kenneth Lieberthal

STUART R. SCHRAM, Ed.: *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
MURRAY YANOWITCH and WESLEY A. FISHER, Eds.: *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR.* New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973.
BORIS MEISSNER, Ed.: *Social Change in the Soviet Union.* London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1972.
L. G. CHURCHWARD: *The Soviet Intelligentsia.* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.

FIFTEEN YEARS ago conventional wisdom dictated the importance of studying the Soviet Union in order to understand the Chinese revolution. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's avowed departure from the Soviet model, that wisdom has unfortunately been abandoned. The present essay-review is intended to serve as a reminder of the methodological and analytical lessons that China specialists can derive from the Soviet experience.

Despite the very substantial differences in the development and stratification policies adopted by these two countries, the Soviet Union's experiences provide the most appropriate reservoir of data available for analysis of the probable successes and difficulties in the massive social programs the Chinese have undertaken. No Western country has undergone a prolonged period of development during which the political authorities controlled the economy and consciously utilized their political and economic leverage to reshape the very thought of the people and the contours of the society they ruled. Even among Communist countries, only the Soviet Union has combined a very strong political system with collectivized and socialized means of production and a strongly-held, socially-oriented ideology over a sufficient period of time to present some solid evidence of the potential capacity of rulers with these resources to effect the social changes they desire. It is this that makes the recent development of sociological inquiry in the USSR so exciting for analysts of China, as well as intriguing in its own right.

OF THE FOUR BOOKS under review, those edited respectively by Stuart R. Schram and by Murray Yanowitch and Wesley A. Fisher provide the most solid basis for comparative analysis of this sort. The bulk of the Yanowitch-Fisher volume consists of the editors' translations of recent works by Soviet sociologists, grouped into sections on new developments in Soviet social stratification theory, empirical results, and social mobility. These are bracketed by an editors' introduction on the development of Soviet studies on stratification and mobility and a concluding commentary on Soviet social stratification research written by Seymour Martin Lipset.

The Schram volume is a collection of essays by European scholars that do more than speak to the questions of "authority, participation, and cultural change in China" suggested by the title. Schram uses his 100-page introduction (more than one-third of the book) to place the Cultural Revolution in perspective through a brilliant analysis of themes in Chinese politics since the 1920's, focusing particularly on Mao's own role. This essay alone makes the book valuable. The other six contributions are on more functionally specific topics (levels of economic decision-making, education, rural industry and the internal transfer of technology, etc.), and their quality varies greatly. Taken as a group, however, they specify clearly the Maoist departure from the Soviet model of development and the related Chinese initiatives to forge a more egalitarian society.

The remaining volumes are less useful for the purposes of cross-

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cultural analysis and therefore will be touched on only briefly here. The volume edited by Boris Meissner is dominated by his own 150-page essay on "Social Change in Bolshevik Russia" and also includes contributions on pre-1917 Russian society and on post-1917 social, educational, and economic policies. The book was originally published in German in 1966; the 1972 translation is interesting but in fact adds little to what other scholars (*e.g.*, Alex Inkeles, Frank Parkin, Robert Feldmesser, David Lane, and the contributors to Cyril Black's *Transformation of Russian Society*[1]) have provided in works already available. The book does, however, serve the useful purpose of reminding readers that it was only some 15 to 25 years after the Bolshevik Revolution that the decisions were made which ensured a markedly stratified social system in the USSR.

L. G. Churchward's *The Soviet Intelligentsia* is a rather narrow study of a crucial group in Soviet society. The author defines the intelligentsia as those people with a tertiary education, and he focuses his inquiry almost exclusively on the 1960's and 1970's. The study provides some useful data on institutions of the intelligentsia (the Soviet Academy of Sciences, research institutes, etc.), on the social composition and life styles of intellectuals, and on their relationships with the party apparatus. On the minus side, Churchward tends toward description rather than analysis, and rather dry description at that. The concluding chapters examining the types of interaction between intellectuals and the political authorities probably provide the most interesting reading in what is on the whole an informative but not very exciting book.

WITH RESPECT TO the main focus of this essay, cross-cultural analysis is always methodologically hazardous, especially when one is dealing with data such as those in the Yanowitch-Fisher volume, where the authors do not relate in detail how their surveys were conducted and analyzed, and when one is comparing cultural traditions as diverse as those of China and Russia. With this caution in mind, what significant lessons does recent Soviet sociological research seem to hold for China?

First and perhaps foremost, the growing literature on Soviet sociology as exemplified by the Yanowitch-Fisher work underscores the extremely unsatisfactory nature of the Chinese data base for vigorous sociological inquiry. In essence, this data problem reflects the fact that part of any social stratification inquiry is concerned with attitudes (*e.g.*, group identity) and preferences (*e.g.*, ranking of career choices) —both of which must be determined through interviews and questionnaires. If the Chinese are undertaking this type of research, they are not making the results known publicly. Other physical indicators, such as income differentials, housing perquisites, and welfare benefits, also provide important information for analysis of social stratification. Here again, however, the Chinese data are grossly inadequate.

Indeed, one cannot help reading the Schram volume (which is of higher quality than many works on China) without being struck by the degree to which the analysts take affirmative statements by the Chinese as solid evidence that programs are in fact being carried out effectively. Thus, for instance, John Gardner and Wilt Idema assert in their article on current educational policy that educational "aid to relatively affluent districts has been discontinued or reduced, but it has been reallocated to the poorer and remote rural areas" (p. 266) without citing evidence to bolster this contention and without indicating the scope and priorities of the transfer (if it in fact is taking place). An essay by Jon Sigurdson, which provides a detailed analysis of the Chinese plan for building up local industry and gradually integrating it with the national economy, uses data consisting primarily of qualitative (not quantitative) statements in the Chinese media combined with observations the author made while traveling in China in 1971. These data *suggest* that current investment patterns promote provincial or "regional" (an ambiguous term in Chinese) equality at the possible cost of increasing interprovincial and interregional disparities (pp. 215 and 231); however, the statistics to test the suggestion are unavailable.[2] (One might note in passing that the Soviet data presented by Yanowitch and Fisher show continuing, marked regional inequalities in income, career prospects, and attitudes—see, *e.g.*, p. 81.) Indeed, with the exception of Andrew Watson's concluding essay on the family, interpersonal relations, and daily life, all the contributions to the Schram volume depict a rather rosy current situation in China largely on the *assump-*

[1] Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960.

[2] Such statistics are available for the 1950's and are currently being analyzed by Nicholas Lardy at the University of Michigan. No adequate statistics are available for the past 14 years.

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tion that the Chinese programs mentioned in the media are in fact being carried out effectively in the various localities.

The Soviet data also sensitize the analyst to the degree to which highly aggregated categories are employed in most analyses of Chinese stratification patterns. In almost every sphere, the Soviet scholars have found group identities and lines of stratification more complex and finely gradated than the literature on China recognizes. For instance, one Soviet study found that there were at least nine large groups among Leningrad machine-building personnel that differed significantly in their socioeconomic characteristics (pp. 65-66). These gradations were found through empirical inquiry and probably fairly accurately reflect the real socioeconomic stratification within this Leningrad industry. These and similar findings throughout the book should give pause to China specialists who find themselves forced by their data to speak collectively of groups such as "workers," "technical specialists," "poor and lower middle peasants," "students," and, of course, "reds" and "experts." Such categorizing may well in fact aggregate out of existence the most meaningful cleavages in China in terms of the personal life experiences of the average Chinese.

Curiously, recent analyses of the Soviet Union, including the three Soviet-related books under review here, tend either to ignore or to play down the important question of the social and political considerations that leaders take into account when making economic decisions. The Schram volume and many other works on China earn a plus for pointing out the significance of such considerations in the Chinese context. Again, however, the problem is that data are rarely available for realistic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the various options in the minds of the leaders and of the affected constituents.

The occasional exception to this statement only serves to prove the rule. To cite an instance that has come to the reviewer's attention, the Red Guards in the city of Tientsin during the Cultural Revolution released a body of documents relating to an earlier decision about whether Tientsin's capitalists should continue to receive interest on capital that had been socialized in 1955-56 beyond the seven-year expiration date (1962) originally set for payment of such interest.[3] The problem arose in the wake of the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, at a time when the Communist leadership was anxious to win over the capitalists so that they would contribute their skills to improving the ominous economic situation.

The Tientsin materials consist of a series of reports providing the results of empirical investigations and of the deliberations of the authorities. These reports divide the capitalists into three groups, according to how much capital they put into the joint state-private enterprises formed in 1955-56. From 1956 to 1962, all capitalists received a 5 percent fixed annual interest on this capital, and many also earned high salaries in their jobs. The opinions of the various groups concerned as to whether interest payments should be abolished in 1962 or extended were briefly as follows:

Large investors: counted on the interest payments for about 50 percent of current income and did not want to give them up; feared political isolation, however, if all smaller investors renounced their payments.

Medium investors: counted on interest payments for about 10 percent of current income; split over the question of renouncing further payments.

Small investors: counted on interest payments for only 2 percent of their current income; figured that by renouncing interest payments they would rid themselves of the "capitalist" label, thereby qualifying for workers' welfare benefits that would exceed their former interest payments; almost all, therefore, favored giving up the interest payments.

One opinion group in the Tientsin party: permit all who want to renounce interest payments to do so and allow all others to retain them (the small investors formed the large majority of Tientsin's capitalists); stress the need to reduce tensions with the former bourgeoisie and enlist their help in economic development.

Second (and eventually predominant) opinion group in the Tientsin party organs: retain fixed interest payments for most investors (including many who want to renounce them) so as to (1) maintain a clear dividing line between the bourgeoisie and the workers, (2) continue to provide material incentives to enlist the cooperation of the bourgeoisie, (3) retain a visible excuse for maintaining a political program aimed at transforming the bourgeoisie, and (4) make a better impression among Overseas Chinese with ties to native capitalists.[4]

[3] The documents are translated in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (published in Hong Kong by the United States Consulate General), No. 619, June 10, 1968, pp. 1-79.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26 and 28-42.

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This brief list provides some sense of the complexity and close interrelationship of political, economic, and social considerations in such decision-making in a socialist country like China. The key elements that divided opinion on this issue—and probably most other matters of a similar nature in China—were more subtle than the public media indicated and more complex than most Western analyses could account for. The Soviet data now becoming available, although lacking specific reference to policymaking desiderata, at least serve as a vivid reminder of the great complexity of the socioeconomic situtation hidden behind the oversimplified, ideologically-defined social categories mentioned in the public media They also point up the types of difficulties that the Chinese can expect to encounter in trying to mold their society and their populace into a historically unique pattern of development.

THE MOST SALIENT phenomenon that emerges from the pages of Yanowitch and Fisher is the intractable nature of inequality resulting from differences in intellectual background and attainment under socialism.

Specifically, Soviet sociologists are finding that even in the 1960's and 1970's family background provides the single most important determinant of the occupational values of Soviet citizens. They are learning, moreover, that this characteristic has proved strongest among the intellectuals, where the countervailing attitudes conveyed to the children through a range of formal channels (schools, mass media, etc.) evidently have only a marginal impact (p. 224). In addition, continuing cognitive differentials in the nature, complexity, and importance of various jobs are providing an ongoing source of inequality of fundamental importance (p. 102). Only better education, then, allows a person to move from one type of position to a qualitatively better job (p. 80). However, "cultural" (highly correlated with family) background determines the degree to which people will avail themselves of the educational opportunities afforded them. Thus the circle is complete, and the intellectuals maintain their positions through a number of generations.

A study of collective farms in the Kalinin Region, Krasnodar Territory, and the Tatar ASSR shows the ramifications of this syndrome. Here analysts found that increasing the degree of latitude of collective farms in decision-making did not make the collective farmers themselves feel that they participated more meaningfully in the affairs of the farms. Rather, the study concluded, "since a large proportion of the collective farmers do not have any skill whatsoever, nor enough education, all of the constantly expanding rights of collective farms are first of all personified in the managerial personnel and specialists . . ." (p. 112). Thus, increasing the latitude in decision-making in effect puts more power into the hands of the more educated personnel at the local level, for only they have the interest, competence, and confidence necessary to exercise fully these newly-available options.

This finding in the Soviet situation should caution analysts against equating decentralization of decision-making in Chinese agriculture with greater egalitarianism within the communes. Indeed, it seems possible that over the long run it will be China's rusticated students who will increasingly monopolize the key decision-making posts in the communes.

In fact, the attempts at decentralization in all spheres of economic decision-making in China may, if the Soviet data can validly be applied to China, simply accentuate differentials within basic-level units, given the low level of mass education in China. Jack Gray's conclusion in the Schram volume that Mao's policies produce a type of socialism that is based on "popular power" may, therefore, overlook a critical element of differentiation among the populace (p. 157). And Mao's stress on the importance of mass education, along with his fears concerning the continuing "elite" culture of the intellectuals passed on through the family, seem fully justified, judging by the Soviet research. The same research also tends to support Mao's belief that this problem will persist for decades, perhaps for centuries, even under the conditions of socialist society.

To sum up, the findings of Soviet sociological inquiry obviously cannot be mechanically applied to China. Given the new research now being carried out in the USSR, however, Soviet writings are again becoming important for understanding the internal dynamics of the People's Republic of China. Recent Soviet research, as exemplified in the Yanowitch and Fisher volume, should sensitize China specialists to the methodological pitfalls inherent in analyzing the results of contemporary Chinese programs. And a careful look at the Soviet data can suggest some of the more intractable problems that the Chinese may face in their search for a socially equitable polity.

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